177 Conn. App. 369 - State v. Thomas’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments.... When making closing arguments to the jury, [however] [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument.... Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based [on] the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.... Moreover, [i]t does not follow ... that every use of rhetorical language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper.... The occasional use of rhetorical devices is simply fair argument.... "Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury's attention from the facts of the case. ... While the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters which the jury ha[s] no right to consider.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 181 Conn. App. 535 - State v. Turner

2. “Our jurisprudence concerning prosecutorial impropriety during closing argument is well established. [I]n analyzing claims of prosecutorial [impropriety], we engage in a two step analytical process. The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. Put differently, [impropriety] is [impropriety], regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial; whether that [impropriety] caused or contributed to a due process violation is a separate and distinct question .... [W]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show ... that the remarks were improper ....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 181 Conn. App. 406 - State v. Artiaco

3. “Although the standard for relevancy is quite low, it is often applied with some rigor.... Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in the proof of the latter.... The determination of relevance must be made according to reason and judicial experience.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 183 Conn. App. 623 - State v. Jackson