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← 177 F.3d 448 - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

177 F.3d 448 · 1999

Citation profile

87
cited by 87 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
September 2019
most recently cited

37 federal appellate · 6 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 87 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2019 · most notably Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002), Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. (2003)

37 federal appellate · 6 district · 4 state decisions

600199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. · Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody · Montana v. United States · Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. · Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 87 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[I]f an individual subject to an arbitration agreement filed a charge with the EEOC and ultimately received a “right to sue” letter, that individual would have a private cause of action that she waived by her prospective agreement to arbitrate. However, if an individual subject to an arbitration agreement filed a charge with the EEOC and put the EEOC on notice of employment practices violative of Title VII, and the EEOC in turn exercised its right to sue, that individual would no longer possess a private cause of action subject to her prior agreement to arbitrate. Rather, the EEOC would have a cause of action on behalf of that individual and the pub- lie interest that would fall outside the arbitration agreement.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “While recognizing that the EEOC’s right of action is separate from the employee’s, circuit courts have uniformly held that the EEOC may not seek monetary relief in the name of an employee who has waived, settled, or previously litigated the claim. To justify this result, courts have relied in large measure on the distinctive enforcement scheme of the ADEA and the belief that in seeking individual monetary relief, as opposed to class-wide injunctive relief, the EEOC does not represent the public interest to the same degree.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “Under federal res judicata, or claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 , 99 S.Ct. 970 , 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). The doctrine precludes litigation of claims that “were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the first proceeding.” Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 , 99 S.Ct. 2205 , 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.