¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶2I concur in that part of the majority opinion that affirms the defendant’s convictions. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that death is an excessive sentence in this case. In my view, the death penalty is appropriate punishment here, and I would therefore consider in this appeal the remaining sentencing issues raised by the defendant.
¶3The record in this case provides ample support for the trial judge’s decision to sentence the defendant to death. The victim was shot outside her home as she and her family were returning from church one evening, and the victim died as a result of her injuries two days later. The victim was married to the father of the defendant’s child, and the defendant had paid a codefendant to kill the wife. By hiring another person to commit the murder, the defendant was eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(5) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(5)).
¶4The defendant argues, and the majority agrees, that the present case is similar to other cases in which this court has vacated death sentences as excessive. See People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338 (1996); People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253 (1989); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145 (1980); People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980). Notably absent from the present case, however, are the mitigating circumstances this court has considered important in earlier decisions in determining that death is an inappropriate punishment. In general terms, cases in which this court has previously vacated death sentences as excessive have involved defendants who were acting in response to what the court in those cases found to be mental or emotional disturbances or abnormally stressful circumstances. Many of those cases have also involved defendants who had led blameless lives and had little, if any, prior contact with the police. See People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 30 (1990).
¶5The present case is much different from the pattern of our previous decisions in which the death penalty has been found to be an excessive sanction. What distinguishes this case from the others is the history of the defendant’s antagonism toward the victim and the amount of careful planning done by the defendant in preparation for the offense. First, the victim’s murder was the culmination of a lengthy and escalating history of aggression by the defendant against the victim. A year before the murder, the defendant had gone to the victim’s residence while armed with both a gun and a hammer. At that time, the defendant and the victim became involved in a fight, which was broken up by a police officer. The victim told the officer that the defendant had previously threatened her with a gun. On a later occasion, the defendant made a threatening telephone call to the victim.
¶6In addition, the murder committed in the present case was not the defendant’s own immediate response to a particularly stressful event but a carefully plotted scheme. The defendant took extensive steps in preparation for the offense. Over the course of several days, the defendant hired someone to commit the murder and located a weapon that could be used in the commission of the crime. By acting through intermediaries and by using someone else’s handgun, the defendant’s apparent goal was to cover up, as well as she could, her own role in the crime. The defendant’s efforts at concealing her responsibility for the murder did not cease with the victim’s death. The defendant later induced the victim’s husband to go into hiding with one of the children so that they could not testify at trial.
¶7In concluding that death is an excessive sentence in this case, the majority emphasizes that the defendant had no significant history of criminal conduct and observes that the defendant’s prior contacts with the police "stemmed from the emotional problems resulting from her relationship with Louia.” 177 Ill. 2d at 100. The majority overstates this aspect of the defendant’s background. Although the absence of a significant criminal record is mitigating, it is not dispositive but is simply one of the various circumstances that the sentencing authority — judge or jury — must consider in determining whether to sentence a particular defendant to death. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(c)(1). We have never held that the death penalty statute is limited in its application to career criminals; in a number of cases, this court has affirmed death sentences imposed against defendants who possessed relatively clean records. See, e.g., People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85,110-11 (1996) (defendant did not have prior criminal record); People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 357-59, 386-87 (1993) (defendant received probation for burglary conviction in 1968; evidence also presented of reports to police of domestic disputes, and of occasion in which defendant, stopped for traffic violation, was carrying loaded handgun); People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 139, 149 (1991) (defendant previously received probation for assault of police officer); People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 29-31 (1990) (defendant did not have prior criminal record). As in the present appeal, the capital offenses committed in a number of these cases were ascribed to problems in romantic relationships. See Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85; Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341; Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127.
¶8In deciding to impose the death penalty in this case, the trial judge explained, in this bench proceeding:
"[A]nd I have to say that the cold, callous acts of the defendant, the moving force behind the murder of Valerie McDonald, bespeak[ ] a woman with a malignant heart. These acts outweigh any mitigation which was presented.
We must send a message to the community that the criminal justice system will not tolerate such acts. Any lesser sentence than the maximum would denigrate the seriousness of this offense.”
¶9The majority’s decision to vacate the defendant’s death sentence in favor of a term of imprisonment accomplishes exactly what the trial judge was seeking to avoid.
¶10The majority properly rejects the defendant’s challenge to the adequacy of the evidence of her guilt. The majority errs, however, in vacating the defendant’s ' death sentence as excessive. If the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions, as the majority concludes, then I believe that the evidence is also sufficient to sustain the defendant’s sentence of death. See People v. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d 238, 276 (1986) ("To be convinced of defendant’s guilt is also to be convinced of the ruthless manner in which he acted”). I would therefore reject the defendant’s contention that death is an excessive sentence, and I would consider in this appeal the defendant’s remaining challenges to the sentencing phase of the proceedings below.
¶11JUSTICES BILANDIC and HEIPLE join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.