177 So. 2d 412 - Danks v. Maher’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In our opinion the counting of laparotomy squares in the instant case was not an act requiring the exercise of a particular skill or discretion acquired or developed by special training. It was an act which could have been done by an unskilled or untrained employee and it did not involve the exercise of any professional judgment. We conclude that the incorrect count was not a medical mistake; it was an administrative or nonprofessional mistake from which liability on the part of the hospital can result."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. American Cas. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. · Ramone v. Mani

2. “"Ordinarily ... the burden of proof would be upon the hospital and its insurer for they are the parties who make that assertion. See Harvey v. Travelers Insurance Co . ... Until [the settlement agreement] ... the burden was upon the plaintiff and appellants had no forewarning at all that they would be forced to carry such a burden. Under these circumstances it would be manifestly unfair to hold that the burden... rests upon the appellants. However we believe it is unnecessary for us to make any determination relative to that burden.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 401 So. 2d 1006 - Raley v. Carter · 377 So. 2d 369 - Wall v. American Employers Ins. Co.

3. “"Our interpretation of the law relating to conventional obligations, therefore, is that where there are only two solidary obligors, and the creditor settles with and grants a remission as to one of them, reserving his rights against the other, the creditor thereby deprives the remaining obligor of his right to a legal subrogation against the released debtor, and accordingly, the creditor thereafter can claim only one-half the debt from the debtor who has not been released. "The right to enforce contribution among joint tort-feasors is based on the same right to legal subrogation which takes place among solidary debtors under conventional obligations. Since the distinction between the two types of solidary obligations has been erased with the 1960 amendment of Article 2103 of the Civil Code, we think the rules heretofore set out relating to the right to legal subrogation in conventional debts apply also to delictal obligations. "We conclude therefore, that where the claimant in a tort action settles with and releases one of two joint tort-feasors, reserving all of his rights against the other, the remaining tort-feasor is thereby deprived of his right to enforce contribution against the one who has been released. And, since the claimant by his own act has deprived the unreleased tort-feasor of this right to enforce contribution, he can recover from the latter only one-half of the damages which he sustained."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 207 So. 2d 160 - Gifford v. Aurand Manufacturing Company