Philip Werlein v. City of New Orleans’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

50 federal appellate · 14 district · 31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 148 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The threatened sale might have been illegal for a number of reasons, based upon widely divergent facts; but whatever those reasons were, the facts upon which they rested were open to proof in the chancery action, and if the city desired the benefit of them they should have been alleged and proved. It would seem to be quite clear that the plaintiff could not be permitted to prove each independent fact in a separate suit. Suppose the city had only set up the fact of the registry, of the judgment as a ground for enjoining the sale, and after a trial on that issue it had been beaten and judgment had gone against it; could the city after that have commenced another suit for the same purpose, and set up as a ground for the alleged illegality of the sale the assignment of the judgment by Klein? In such second action would not the judgment in. the prior action conclude the city? If not, then on being beaten on a trial of that issue the city could commence still another action based on the allegation that the judgment had been paid. Thus, as many different actions as the city might allege grounds for claiming the sale would be illegal could be maintained seriatim, and no one judgment would conclude the city, except as to the particular ground upon which the city proceeded in each particular case. And yet all these different grounds would simply form evidence upon which the original cause of action was based, namely, the alleged illegality of the apprehended sale. They would form simp”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. The New Brunswick · Brown v. Fletcher

2. ““A former judgment between the parties (or their privies) upon the same cause of action as that stated in the second case constitutes an absolute bar to the prosecution of the second action, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Where the second between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the former action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue, or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. The New Brunswick · Di Iorio v. Wm. H. Considine & Co.

3. ““The estoppel resulting from the thing adjudged does not depend upon whether there is the same demand in both cases, but it exists even although •there be different demands, when the question upon which the recovery of the second demand depends has, under identical circumstances and conditions, been previously concluded by a judgment between the same parties and their privies.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n of Syracuse v. Welling