Williams v. Wingo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The prohibition on the court and the board of county commissioners to grant a license for another ferry, it is urged, would seem to show an intent to make the grant exclusive. And that the reason for this might he found in the alleged fact, that when the ferry was first established, a considerable expenditure was required, and little or no profit was realized for some years. But all the judges present except one held that the grant was not intended to he exclusive. In their opinion this view is sustained by the consideration that, although the county court and county commissioners were prohibited from granting another license at Dubuque, yet this prohibition did not apply to the legislature; and as it had the power to authorize another ferry, the general authority to the council to ‘license and establish ferries across the Mississippi river at the city,’ enabled the corporation, in the exercise of its discretion, to grant a license, as the legislature might have done. “This power was clearly given to the city, and it may he exercised, unless the grant of Fanning be exclusive. “The hoard of commissioners has been established, and the legislature has substituted in its place, for the purpose of licensing ferries at Dubuque, the city council, and it is contended that this change of the power ought not to affect the rights of the plaintiff. The restriction on the commissioners of the county does not apply, in terms, to the city council; and the court think it cannot be made to a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State Highway Commission v. Smith

2. ““The act of 1840 was one of general legislation, and subject to repeal by the general assembly. No rights could be created under that statute beyond its terms, and by it no restraint was placed upon législative action. When the general assembly gave to the county courts power to license ferries it by that act in effect forbade them to establish a second ferry within half a mile of one already established, but that bound only the county court. It did not tie the hands of the legislature, or prevent it from authorizing another ferry within a half mile whenever in its judgment it saw fit. A contract binding ’ the state is only created by clear language, and is not to be extended by implication beyond the terms of the statute.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State Highway Commission v. Smith

3. “A contract binding the State is only created by clear language, and is not to be extended by implication beyond the terms of the statute. ... In the case at bar . . . the act .. . operated in no manner as a restraint on the legislature or as a contract upon its part that the State would not act whenever in its judgment it perceived the necessity for an additional ferry. ... No promise made: by the legislature by the first act is broken by the second.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wood v. Lovett