¶1 I concur in the judgment and in everything written by Mr. Justice Richards in the opinion, and I do so the more readily because I have never believed in the soundness of the doctrine announced in such cases as Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476, [98 Am. St. Rep. 73, 74 Pac. 28], and Grannis v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 245, [106 Am. St. Rep. 23, 79 Pac. 891], that the state is a party interested in every divorce case. I do not believe that in any logical sense the state should be considered a party to a divorce proceeding any more than it is a party to any other suit to terminate a status fixed by contract. Heretofore the doctrine of the state's being a party interested in such an action has been useful only to save the procedure prescribed by statutes which would be otherwise vulnerable to the charge of unconstitutionality. Perhaps the end justified the fiction; but if it were more than a fiction of very limited applicability, the supposed standing of the state as a party in interest in every action for divorce might be invoked, with reason, it seems to me, as giving to a court of equity jurisdiction of an action to set aside an interlocutory decree obtained by collusion of husband and wife.
178 Cal. 359
173 P 579
Bancroft v. Bancroft
Decided June 3, 1918
California Supreme Court · decided 1918-06-03
<p>Judgment—Collusion in Procuring Decree—Action to Set Aside—Equity will not Interfere.—It is a general rule in this state that courts of equity will not interfere to relieve a party to an action from a judgment procured through a collusive agreement between the parties to the effect that one of them shall commence the action and obtain, by consent of the other, a judgment to which he would not otherwise be entitled.</p> <p>Divorce—Interlocutory Decree Obtained by Collusion—Action to Set Aside — Pleading — Complaint Insufficient — Judgment on Demurrer.—A demurrer to a complaint is properly sustained without leave to amend, and judgment is properly entered dismissing an action brought by a wife in May, 1917, to set aside an interlocutory decree of divorce obtained by her husband in June, 1916, on the ground of desertion, where the facts alleged in the complaint to set the decree aside are, in substance, that in pursuance of a previous agreement and understanding between the husband and wife, by which the husband was to pay her a monthly allowance and permit her to visit their two minor sons, she appeared by attorney but interposed no defense nor objection in an action for divorce brought by him on the ground of desertion, falsely alleged by him in his complaint and falsely testified to by him on the trial, and that after the entry of the interlocutory decree he refused to permit her to see or visit the children and failed and refused to pay her the agreed monthly allowance.</p> <p>Id.—Collusive Decrees—General Bulb Against Interference in Equity—Extent of Exception in Divorce Oases.—The exception in divorce cases to the general rule that courts of equity will not interfere to relieve one of the parties to a collusive decree is con-find to those cases where, in the action itself, the court has full control over its own decrees.</p> <p>Id.—Absence op Equitable Considerations or Public Interest.— After the time has passed within which the court has power to relieve against a judgment by motion under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the time to appeal from the judgment has also expired, one who seeks relief in another tribunal by independent action should be required to make an affirmative showing of some equitable consideration or some good reason sounding in public policy, and in-the absence of such equitable considerations or of any showing that the public interest or policy would be served in preserving the marriage relation in the particular case, the general rule will-prevail in divorce as in other eases, and courts of equity will not interfere with judgments in such eases obtained solely through the collusion and connivance of the parties to the proceeding.</p>
Relies on Deyoe v. Superior Court · Grannis v. Superior Court
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1918-06-03
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently September 1966 · most notably McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925), 55 Cal. App. 2d 421 - Wilson v. Wilson (1942)
33 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
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