¶1dissenting:
¶2I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that since the easement in question was granted in 1892, during the horse and buggy era, the original parties to that grant could not have intended to allow parking on the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. The record provides no support for this conclusion, nor does the majority explain why it is not conceivable that the original parties could have intended to permit the easement holder to park a buggy or wagon on the easement.
¶3The owner of the dominant estate is entitled to the necessary use of the easement. (Flower v. Valentine (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039, 482 N.E.2d 682, 687.) Necessary use is defined as the use which is reasonably necessary for full enjoyment of the premises. (Flower, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 482 N.E.2d at 708.) The question of what constitutes a necessary use is one for the trier of fact. (Beggs v. Ragsdale (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 333, 338, 457 N.E.2d 1079, 1083.) In the case at bar, the trial judge properly determined that parking was a necessary and reasonable use of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate. Since the driveway does not lead to a garage, it can only be used for parking. As the trial court recognized, the easement is worthless to defendants if they are not permitted to park on it.
¶4I do not believe the authorities from other jurisdictions cited by the majority are persuasive. I would follow the general rule that an easement holder may park on the easement so long as this would not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the holder of the servient estate. (State v. Larason (1956), 75 Ohio Abs. 211,_, 143 N.E.2d 502, 504; Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 944, 946-47 (1954).) This rule was applied in Potter v. Gustafson (1963), 41 Del. Ch. 229, 192 A.2d 453, and Penn Bowling Recreation Centers, Inc. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1949), 179 F.2d 64.
¶5In Potter, the court ruled that an owner of marshland had an easement over adjacent farmland to reach the marsh. (Potter, 41 Del. Ch. at 229-30, 192 A.2d at 454.) In order to reach the marsh, the owner had to travel on a road on the farm, and then walk on the farmland after the road ended. The court also concluded that under the circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable to construe the easement in such a manner that the marsh owner would be permitted to park a motor vehicle on a turnaround at the end of the road because otherwise he would be unnecessarily forced to do additional walking in order to reach the marsh. 41 Del. Ch. at 233-34, 192 A.2d at 456.
¶6In Penn Bowling, plaintiff held an easement for ingress and egress on a driveway located on defendant’s property. The court stated that plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable use of the easement and that the question of what constituted a reasonable use would be resolved by construing the easement in light of the situation of the property and' the surrounding circumstances. (Penn Bowling, 179 F.2d at 67.) Since defendant, the owner of the servient estate, needed the driveway almost constantly for business purposes, the court ruled that plaintiff would not be permitted to park vehicles on the driveway. 179 F.2d at 64.
¶7The circumstances of this case dictate the result reached by the trial court. Plaintiffs have a garage which is accessible by means other than a driveway. Defendants have an easement on a driveway which leads nowhere and can only be used for parking. The only reasonable manner in which the easement can be construed in light of these circumstances is to hold that it permits defendants to park on their easement. While the majority complains that such an interpretation deprives plaintiffs of the use of their property, the majority’s interpretation prevents anyone from using the driveway for its principal function, parking. Since I do not agree that this result is required by the applicable case law or by logic, I respectfully dissent.