178 Ind. App. 293 - Capps v. Klebs’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 37 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently August 2013 · most notably 104 Wash. 2d 543 - Elovich v. Nationwide Insurance (1985), Kral v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. (1989)
2 federal appellate · 37 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 48 Ill. 2d 1 - Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance · 148 Ind. App. 297 - Indiana Insurance v. Noble Ex Rel. Jordan · 148 Ind. App. 548 - Patton v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America · Security National Insurance v. Hand · Raitt v. National Grange Mutual Insurance
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he general rule applicable to actions based on the ground of subrogation is that the right does not exist unless the whole debt has been paid. Even if a surety is liable for only part of the debt and pays that part for which he is liable, he cannot be subrogated until the whole demand or debt is satisfied. The rule applies to contractual as well as equitable subrogation, unless the contract by which such right is created provides otherwise. Where the claim to pro tanto subrogation (subrogation before the debt is satisfied) is based in contract, the contract must be clear, unequivocal and so certain as to admit no doubt on the question”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““If Trinity’s [the insurer] interpretation of the subrogation provision were adopted in this case, Trinity would, in effect, be allowed to avoid its statutory obligation to provide a minimum of $30,000.00 to compensate its insured for losses caused by the uninsured motorist, although the policyholder remains uncompensated for such losses. The statute was designed to diminish this type of uncompensated loss up to the limits of the required policy provision. Pro tanto subrogation would effectively nullify the coverage ostensibly provided by the policy. The Capps would be in a worse position than they would have been in had Klebs been insured. ° 0 “To allow subrogation when the Capps have not been fully compensated places them in the same position as if Klebs was uninsured and there was no uninsured motorist statute in effect. Under such circumstances there would be no advantage to paying premiums for uninsured motorist protection in such joint tortfeasor situations. We cannot ascribe such an intent to the legislature. The only purpose of the subrogation provision that is consistent with the statutory framework of minimum coverages required by law is to prevent double recovery.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“in substantially the same position he would have occupied had the offending party complied with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility act.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.