Premo v. Moore

Decided January 19, 2011

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 2011-01-19

Cited by 216 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2020 · most notably Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017), Jae Lee v. United States (2017)

83 federal appellate · 10 district · 25 state decisions — followed in 15 states

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Pillault v. United States, Clarke v. Galdamez

“As Moore's counsel confirmed at oral argument ... Moore never declared that, better informed, he would have resisted the plea bargain and opted for trial.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Mellott v. State

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Hill v. Lockhart

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2011-01-19

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1SEPARATE OPINION

Justice Ginsburg,

¶2concurring in the judgment.

¶3To prevail under the prejudice requirement of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), a petitioner for federal habeas corpus relief must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial,” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). As Moore’s counsel confirmed at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, Moore never declared that, better informed, he would have resisted the plea bargain and opted for trial. For that reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment.