¶1(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the facts of this case do not appear to support the grant of equitable relief suggested by the majority. The parties’ 1979 divorce awarded custody of the three children, Michael, born February 28, 1971, Ronald, born October 31, 1972, and Brandi, born June 26, 1975, to defendant. In August, 1983, plaintiff filed a petition seeking custody of the three children. In her answer to the petition, defendant stated that plaintiff was not the biological father of Michael. On November 16, 1983, the divorce judgment was modified to give plaintiff custody of Michael and Ronald, but left custody of Brandi with defendant. On May 29, 1984, defendant filed a petition for custody of Michael, which petition was dismissed. She filed further, subsequent petitions seeking to regain custody of both Michael and Ronald. On January *10925, 1985, custody of Michael was awarded to defendant and custody of Ronald to plaintiff. This order provided, inter alia:
it is further ordered and adjudged that based upon the allegations of debra lynn Johns, the Plaintiif in this matter, Robert h. Johns, is not the biological father of the minor child, michael Anthony Johns, and further, based upon the current set of circumstances, it is the Order of this Court that there shall be no requirement to pay child support on behalf of the Plaintiff, Robert h. Johns, to the Defendant, debra lynn Johns, for the support and maintenance of the minor child, michael ANTHONY JOHNS.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that no child support shall be required by the Plaintiff to the Defendant for the support and maintenance of brandy Christine [sic] Johns, and further, no child support shall be required payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, for ronald wayne Johns, for the reason that custody of each of the minor children does hereby offset this matter. [Emphasis added.]
¶2In 1987, further change of custody and child support petitions were filed, culminating in a December 23, 1987, order awarding $100 per week child support to defendant for Brandi, but denying child support for Michael, because defendant had previously claimed plaintiff was not Michael’s biological father.
¶3On appeal, defendant wants child support for Michael, retroactive to October 12, 1987, he having reached eighteen on February 28,1989.
¶4While I would not disagree with some of the broad policy articulated by the majority, I doubt that it is applicable here. There was no evidentiary hearing here. The only evidence that plaintiff *110is not the biological father of Michael is an assertion of defendant in a 1983 pleading, some four years after the divorce, which divorce implicitly treated plaintiff as Michael’s legal father. Neither is it clear as to when the mother ñrst made known to the father that she was claiming he was not the biological father. The trial court record indicates that it was defendant, and not plaintiff, who made the belated claim that plaintiff was not the biological father of Michael and who used that assertion in an attempt to retain custody. This does not look like an equitable basis for holding that plaintiff is estopped from challenging defendant’s tardy effort to collect child support from him retroactively, now that the boy is over eighteen.
¶5On the skimpy record before us, I would hold that defendant has not met her burden of proof and, therefore, would decline to reverse. I would remand this case to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing (if either party wishes) relating to whether or not defendant was entitled to child support for Michael from plaintiff during the period indicated, after which the trial judge should make findings of fact necessary to the decision.
¶6I would remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.