majority"> Allew, J.

Tbe evidence of tbe negligence of tbe daughter, who was driving tbe automobile, is not satisfactory, but’ conceding that it was sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury, and also that there is evidence that tbe defendant was tbe owner of tbe automobile, these facts alone would not establish tbe liability of tbe defendant for tbe injuries which tbe plaintiff has sustained.

Tbis was expressly decided in Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C., 99, where it is said, “Tbe owner of an automobile is not liable for personal injuries caused by it merely because of bis ownership”; and, again, “Even if tbe son bad been tbe servant of bis father in driving tbe machine, tbe father would not be liable for bis negligence unless bis son was. at tbe time acting in tbe scope of bis employment and in regard to bis master’s business.”

Tbe responsibility of tbe parent for tbe negligence of thp child of mature years, and of experience as a driver, is not dependent on tbe ownership of tbe machine, but upon tbe principles of agency, express or implied, and in tbis case there is no evidence that tbe daughter was on any mission or performing any service for tbe defendant, her mother.

*483 Tbe two cases on which the plaintiff chiefly relies, Williams v. May, 173 N. C., 78, and Wilson v. Polk, 175 N. C., 490, are easily distinguishable.

In the first, it was in evidence that the father bought a car for the use of his family, and employed on'e Orendorff to teach his minor child to run it, and while in this employment the plaintiff was injured, and in the second, there was evidence that the owner was in the car at the time of the injury, and that it was going on a mission to her farm for her.

In our opinion, the motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly sustained.

Affirmed.

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