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178 N.C. 637

101 S.E 369

White v. . Scott

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided December 10, 1919

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1919-12-10

Civil actioN, tried before Harding, J., at April Term, 1919, of' Cabaeeus. Plaintiff alleged tbat defendant had executed to her intestate, Mary J.. Scott, three notes, one for $250, on 14 March, 1896; one for $50, on 3 April, 1897; and the remaining one for $320, on 9 July, 1896, all of' them due one day after date, with interest from date.

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently June 1957

2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1919-12-10

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Walker, J.,

¶1 after stating the relevant facts as above: The defendant -executed the three notes to the plaintiff as far back as the years 1896 • and 1897, so that they are barred by the statute of limitations, unless the plaintiff’s intestate was insane at the time the cause of action upon the notes accrued, for that is the language of the statute, as will appear by this reproduction of it: “No person shall avail himself of a disability, ■unless it existed when his right of action accrued.” Code of 1883, sec. 169; Eevisal of 1905, sec. 169. According to the evidence in this case, Mrs. Scott’s illness occurred in the year 1909, and, as it was subsequent to the accrual of the cause of action, it did not interrupt the operation • of the statute, if the full time had not elapsed before her illness commenced. Eller v. Church, 121 N. C., 269; Asbury v. Fair, 111 N. C., 251. It is familiar learning that when the statute once begins to run no disability will stop it. Kennedy v. Cromwell, 108 N. C., 1; Ervin v. Broohs, 111 N. C., 358; Causey v. Snow, 122 N. C., 326; Self v. Shugart, 135 N. C., 187. "When it starts to run during the lifetime of the ancestor, it does not stop, even though the heir is under disability at the death ■ of the former, and at the time of descent cast. Chancey v. Powell, 103 N. C., 159; Frederick v. Williams, ib., 189; Wood on Limitations, 11; Pearce v. House, term report, 722. It must appear that disability existed when the right of action accrued. Gudger v. R. R., 106 N. C., 481. This being so, and all the evidence showing that the illness of Mrs. Scott ■ occurred long after the accrual of the cause of action on the several notes — and there being no evidence, as we think, to the contrary — the court was right in dismissing the action.

¶2 The contention as to the trust relation between the defendant and'the intestate is entirely without any merit. There is no sufficient' evidence vto' sustain any such view with reference to these notes. The plaintiff *639 was at the perfect liberty to sue upon them without making any demand.

¶3 There is no error in the proceedings of the court.

¶4 No error.

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