In Re Kepka’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is clear from former section 1.02 that the purpose of the entire statute — even those substantive provisions that did not expressly mention insurance — was to decrease the costs of health-care liability claims, through modifications of the insurance, tort, and medical-practice systems, in order to make insurance reasonably affordable so that health-care providers could have protection against potential liability and so that citizens could have more affordable and accessible health care.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Villas of Mount Pleasant, LLC v. King · Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Lira

2. “(a) No physician, professional association of physicians, or other health care provider shall request or require a patient or prospective patient to execute an agreement to arbitrate a health care liability claim unless the form of agree ment delivered to the patient contains a written notice in 10-point boldface type clearly and conspicuously stating: UNDER TEXAS LAW, THIS AGREEMENT IS INVALID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT UNLESS IT IS ALSO SIGNED BY AN ATTORNEY OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING. THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A WAIVER OF IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY. YOU SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Villas of Mount Pleasant, LLC v. King · Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez

3. “An arbitration agreement may recognize that certain non-parties who have the appropriate sort of privity with one of the signatories — those such as assignees, agents, subrogated insurers, representatives, trustees, third-party beneficiaries, etc. — are bound by the agreement because those types of non-parties “stand in the shoes” of one of the signatories, are authorized to make decisions on a signatory’s behalf or for its benefit, were intended to benefit from the signatories’ contract, or the like.... Some individuals who qualify as heirs might also fall within this type of privity: for example, children or a surviving spouse who assert claims as the estate’s representative on the estate’s behalf. However, under basic contract principles, parties to an arbitration agreement generally have no authority to bind by their contract anyone who does not have the requisite privity with at least one of them or with the contract itself to arbitrate anything....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Jindal Saw Ltd.