¶1MEMORANDUM OPINION
¶2I. INTRODUCTION
¶3Plaintiff Joann Green filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Commissioner’s decision, arguing-that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that she is not disabled was not based on substantial evidence. Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),
¶4Upon this Court’s careful, independent consideration of the administrative record, the parties’ submissions, and the applicable law, the Court has determined that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, Plaintiffs objections to the R&R will be sustained, and the case will be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
¶5*483II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶6Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on December 20, 2010, and filed an application for SSI on February 25, 2011.
¶7After exhausting her administrative appeals, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, contending that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed-to consider Plaintiffs mild impairments in daily living activities and concentration, persistence, or pace in the RFC analysis. The Magistrate Judge con-eluded that the ALJ did not err in failing to consider these impairments and recommended that the Court deny Plaintiffs request for review.
¶8III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9An ALJ reviewing an application for disability benefits must employ the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the SSA.
¶10A court reviewing a Social Security case must base its decision on the record of the administrative proceedings and the pleadings of the parties.
¶11A district court must review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which a party has objected.
¶12Y. DISCUSSION
¶13Plaintiff argues that the R&R erred in concluding that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ’s RFC assessment and hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert failed to incorporate the ALJ’s own findings that Plaintiff has mild limitations in activities of daily living and concentration, persistence, or pace as a result of her depression.
¶14An ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s medically determinable impairments in assessing a claimant’s RFC, including impairments that are not severe.
¶15The R&R found that the ALJ did not err by failing to include Plaintiffs mild limitations in activities of daily living and *485concentration, persistence, or pace in the RFC assessment or in the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert because the limitations were not credibly established, lacking support in the record. After reviewing the record, the R&R determined that the evidence of Plaintiffs depression was limited to Plaintiffs own allegations of depression and the evaluation of Dr. James Vizza, Psy.D. The R&R concluded that this evidence was insufficient to support Plaintiffs claimed limitations in activities of daily living and concentration, persistence, or pace and therefore the limitations were not credibly established.
¶16The record includes Plaintiffs assertions that she has difficulty completing tasks, concentrating, and understanding, and that she has difficulty handling stress,
¶17The Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ did not include all of the limitations in her hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, but ’ contends that the ALJ made her findings as to these limitations when assessing Plaintiffs mental impairments at step 2 of the sequential analysis,
¶18*486The Court thus holds that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ’s RFC assessment and hypothetical questioning did not include Plaintiff’s credibly established mild limitations in activities of daily living and concentration, persistence, or pace.
¶19VI. CONCLUSION
¶20For the foregoing reasons, this Court sustains Plaintiffs objections to the R&R, grants Plaintiffs request for review, and remands for further consideration pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). An appropriate order follows.
¶21. See Local R. Civ. Pro. 72.1.1(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
¶22. R. 30.
¶23. R. 37. ‘‘MRSA stands for methicillin-resisi-tant [] Staphylococcus aureus. MRSA’ is a ‘staph’ germ that does not get better with the first-line antibiotics that usually cure staph inféctions.” R. 34 (internal citation omitted).
¶24. R. 38-39.
¶25. R. 41-42.
¶26. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir.2000).
¶27. 20 C.F.R, §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987).
¶28. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(d).
¶29. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
¶30. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
¶32. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
¶33. Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.1999).
¶34. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.2001).
¶35. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (citation omitted); Jesurum v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.1995).
¶36. See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
¶37. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 38.
¶38. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c).
¶39. Id.
¶40. Pl.’s Obj. to the R&R 2, Doc. No. 17. At step 2 of the analysis, the ALJ found "[w]ith respect to the claimant’s ability to perform daily living activities, the undersigned finds the claimant’s mental condition [of depression] results in only mild impairment in this functional area, and in her ability to sustain concentration, persistence, and pace.” R. 39.
¶41. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
¶42. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir.2005) (emphasis added).
¶44. R&R at 11-13. In effect, the R&R concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence because one of the ALJ’s factual findings was not supported by the record.
¶45. R. 212-13.
¶46. R. 530, R. 537
¶47. R. 371, 375, 377.
¶48. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
¶49. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a ("[W]hen we evaluate the severity of mental impairments for adults (persons age 18 and over)...we must follow a special technique at each level in the administrative review process.”). This special technique requires the ALJ to assess the claimant's degree of functional limitation by rating the claimant's degree of functional limitation in four broad areas: “Activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompen-sation.” Id.
¶50. 372 F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir.2004).
¶51. Id. at 551, 555.
¶52. See e.g., Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 554; Washington v. Astrue, No. 08-2938, 2009 WL 855893, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 31, 2009) (holding that remand was necessary where ALJ found at step 4 that the plaintiff could perform her past relevant work but failed to include the plaintiffs mild limitations in social functioning and concentration in her RFC assessment and hypothetical to the vocational expert); Curran v. Astrue, No. 11-5894, 2012 WL 5494616, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 13, 2012) (holding that the ALJ’s hypothetical was incomplete where it failed to address the Plaintiffs mild functional limitations in daily living, social functioning, and concentration, persistence or pace).