179 Ind. App. 267 - Fox v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(T)he Bruton rule applies with equal force to all statements that tend significantly to incriminate a co-defendant, whether or not he is actually named in the statement. The fact that the incrimination amounts to a link in a chain of circumstances rather than a direct accusation cannot dispose of the applicability of the Bruton rule. Just as one can be convicted on circumstantial evidence, one can be circumstantially accused. Fox v. State (Ind.App.1979) [ 179 Ind.App. 267 ], 384 N.E.2d 1159 , 1170. State v. Moritz , 63 Ohio St.2d 150 , 155, 407 N.E.2d 1268 , 1272 (1980).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Luckie · State v. Robinson, 05 Je 8 (7-5-2007)

2. ““ * * * The statute, I.C. 35-16-1-1, uses the terms ‘wilfully and maliciously.’ A ‘willful’ setting fire to or burning would be such an act consciously and intentionally, as distinguished from accidentally, involuntarily, or negligently done, and implies that the act must be done knowingly and according to a purpose. ... A ‘malicious ’ burning is an act done with a condition of mind that shows a heart regardless of social duty and bent on mischief, evidencing a design to do an intentional wrongful act toward another without any legal justification or excuse. * * *” (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) “Willful" has been defined as follows: “Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary. . Intractable; having a headstrong disposition to act by the rule of contradiction. . . . Obstinate; perverse. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; not accidental or involuntary. * * * * * * Conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice. . Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful; without legal justification. . . .” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Brown v. State

3. ““[Ejvidence of companionship with one engaged in a crime, a course of conduct before and after the offense, and failure to oppose the crime when imposed with a duty to do so, without active participation in the commission of the crime, are circumstances which may be considered in determining whether aiding and abetting may be inferred. Cotton v. State (1965), 247 Ind. 56 , 211 N.E.2d 158 . However, an inference from such evidence, to be reasonable, must be coupled with evidence of knowledge or evidence from which knowledge may be reasonably inferred, that the criminal conduct is contemplated, in progress or completed.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Byrer v. State