dissent">GARRARD, Presiding Judge,

dissenting.

I must vigorously dissent to the majority opinion in this case and must further state that I believe the case of Mid America Homes v. Horn (1978), Ind.App., 377 N.E.2d 657, recently handed down by this court was wrongly decided.

While it is true that a friend of appellant, who described himself as assisting the contractor, contracted Gee Co., the court’s findings clearly show that judgment was not entered upon the basis that Gee Co. dealt directly with the owner within the contemplation of IC 32-8-3-1.

What does not appear in the majority opinion is that Wiggin contracted with one Singleton to build the addition for $27,-835.20; that she paid him $26,000; that he did not complete the job; and that she expended additional funds for its completion. Gee Co.’s invoices were billed to Singleton.

I quite agree with the majority that the purpose of the amendments to the mechanic’s lien statute, IC 32-8-3-1, was to protect the owner-occupier of a one or two family residence from the lien rights of subcontractors and materialmen unless the owner was given written notice at the outset of the potential for such a lien.1 Then he could insure that if he paid the prime contractors the subs would be paid; that if the contractor became insolvent he would not have to either pay twice for the work or lose his home.

The pertinent portion of the statute states,

“Any person . . . who sells or furnishes on credit any material, labor or *1221machinery for the alteration or repair of any owner-occupied single or double family dwelling or the appurtenances or additions thereto, to . anyone other than the occupying owner or his legal representative shall furnish to the occupying owner ... a written notice . of the existence of lien rights, within five [5] days from the date of first delivery or labor performed. The furnishing of such notice shall be a condition precedent to the right of acquiring a lien 2

There is no question but that Gee Co. furnished no such notice. There is no question that we are concerned with an owner-occupied single family dwelling and an alteration and addition thereto.

The trial court and the majority conclude that because the addition was to be used primarily for conducting a home business, although it would also be used for family purposes, the statute is inapplicable.

I cannot agree. The plain language of the statute makes no such distinction or qualification. Nor can I agree with the inference the majority draws from the legislative purpose. The purpose was to protect the owner-occupiers and their homes from contractors who did not pay their subcontractors and materialmen unless the homeowner had notice of their lien rights. The majority result appears to me to do the contrary.

I dissent.

. Of course where the owner deals directly with a subcontractor or materialman he knows of the debt and, as the statute recognizes, does not need the protection.

. The majority opinion errs in asserting this notice is to be “filed” with the recorder.

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