179 Md. App. 485 - Ingram v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
18
cited by 18 later decisions
1
states following
April 2018
most recently cited
18 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Blockburger v. United States · Brown v. Ohio · Hill v. United States · United States v. Dixon
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The scope of this privilege, allowing collateral and belated attacks on the sentence and excluding waiver as a bar to relief, is narrow____ We have consistently defined this category of ‘illegal sentence’ as limited to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself; i.e., there either has been no conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is intrinsically and substantively unlawful. See Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 463 , 886 A.2d 562, 565 (2005); Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 133 , 883 A.2d 916, 919 (2005); Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 321-23 , 558 A.2d 715, 718-19 (1989). As we made clear in Randall Book Corp., any other deficiency in the sentence that may be grounds for an appellate court to vacate it — impermissible considerations in imposing it, for example — must ordinarily be raised in or decided by the trial court and presented for appellate review in a timely-filed direct appeal. The sentence may not be attacked belatedly and collaterally through a motion under Rule 4-345(a), and, subject to the appellate court’s discretion under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), the defendant is not excused from having to raise a timely objection in the trial court.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage““The Supreme Court, for Constitutional purposes, and we, as a matter of common law, have rejected an ‘actual evidence’ test to determine sameness in law, and we see no profit, absent special circumstances not present here, in adopting that test to determine sameness in fact. In most cases, the only sensible and workable criterion for determining the nature and scope of the prior offense is the effective charging document. That states the offense for which the defendant was tried.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage““As the Court of Appeals explained in Anderson, 385 Md. at 140-41 , 867 A.2d 1040 , the question of whether offenses are separate for double jeopardy purposes is generally determined by reviewing the charging documents rather than the actual trial evidence.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.