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179 Mont. 281

587 P.2d 1297

State v. Azure

Montana Supreme Court

Decided November 6, 1978

Montana Supreme Court · decided 1978-11-06

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[a] law which eliminates or delays a defendant's parole eligibility after the criminal offense has been committed is ex post facto as applied to that defendant”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Thomas

Relies on Till v. New Mexico · Greenfield v. Scafati · State v. Gone

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1978-11-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently July 2019 · most notably State v. Finley (1996), State v. Mount (2003)

27 state decisions

12019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HASWELL

¶1 delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶2*282 Defendant appeals from the sentence imposed upon him following his conviction of mitigated deliberate homicide in the District Court of Phillips County.

¶3 This appeal marks the second time this case has been before this Court. See State v. Azure (1977), 175 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d 179. While we held the District Court erred in not allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to deliberate homicide we remanded the case to the District Court for trial.

¶4 Defendant was charged with killing Randy Lewis on June 23, 1976, and went on trial for deliberate homicide in April, 1978. He was convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide.

¶5 On April 17, 1978, defendant received a 40-year sentence providing that he would not be eligible for parole until he had served one-half of his term, less good time allowances. Defendant now appeals from the sentence imposed.

¶6 The sole issue on appeal is whether the imposition for conviction under statutes not in force at the time the offense was committed is an ex post facto application of the law and therefore unconstitutional. We hold that it is under authority of State v. Gone (1978), 179 Mont. 271, 587 P.2d 1291.

¶7 A law which eliminates or delays a defendant’s parole eligibility after the criminal offense has been committed is ex post facto as applied to that defendant. State v. Gone, supra, State ex rel. Nelson v. Ellsworth (1963), 142 Mont. 14, 380 P.2d 886; Greenfield v. Scafati (D.Mass. 1967) 277 F.Supp. 644, aff’d per curiam (1968), 390 U.S. 713, 88 S.Ct. 1409, 20 L.Ed.2d 250. The State agrees with defendant that the applications of these statutes is ex post facto in his case.

¶8 As in Gone, we strike the provision eliminating parole eligibility until one-half of his term is served, less good time allowances.

¶9 As so modified, the sentence is affirmed.

MR. JUSTICES DALY, HARRISON, SHEA and SHEEHY concur.
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