179 N.C. App. 795 - Swain v. Swain’s Empirical Analysis
2006
Citation profile
6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
October 2018
most recently cited
6 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Quick v. Quick · Williams v. Williams · Beall v. Beall · Rickert v. Rickert · Rowe v. Rowe
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The financial worth or "estate" of both spouses must also be considered by the trial court in determining which spouse is the dependent spouse. We do not think, however, that usage of the word "estate" implies a legislative intent that a spouse seeking alimony who has an estate sufficient to maintain that spouse in the manner to which he or she is accustomed, [t]hrough estate depletion , is disqualified as a dependent spouse. Such an interpretation would be incongruous with a statutory emphasis on "earnings," "earning capacity," and "accustomed standard of living." It would also be inconsistent with plain common sense. If the spouse seeking alimony is denied alimony because he or she has an estate which can be spent away to maintain his or her standard of living, that spouse may soon have no earnings or earning capacity and therefore no way to maintain any standard of living. We think, therefore, that the trial court consideration of the "estates" of the parties is intended primarily for the purpose of providing it with another guide in evaluating the earnings and earning capacity of the parties, and not for the purpose of determining capability of self-support through estate depletion. We think this is equally true in giving consideration to the estate of the alleged supporting spouse. Obviously, a determination that one is the supporting spouse because he or she can maintain the dependent spouse at the standard of living to which they were accustomed through estate depletio”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Considering that plaintiff's estate is substantially larger than defendant's estate, it would be unfair to require defendant to further deplete her estate while allowing plaintiff to maintain his. Instead, the trial court ordered a reduction in alimony from $4,300 per month to $3,600 per month. This award does not fully meet defendant's living expenses and is greater than plaintiff's disposable income after meeting his own expenses. Because the award requires both parties to deplete their estates to meet their living expenses, the trial court's reduction of alimony was fair to both parties, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[a]ctual ability to pay is not a factor requiring findings of fact under N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(b). Furthermore, “the failure of the court to make a specific finding of fact as to' [the supporting spouse’s] ability to pay is not deemed a sufficient ground for disturbing the court’s order.” Although actual ability to pay is relevant to the court’s determination of fairness to the parties, it is not error for a court to omit a specific finding of actual ability to pay where the court clearly considered the defendant’s actual ability to pay.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.