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← 179 U.S. 606 - Kenaday v. Sinnott

Kenaday v. Sinnott’s Empirical Analysis

179 U.S. 606 · 1900

Citation profile

121
cited by 121 later decisions
5
cited 5 times by the Supreme Court
21
states following
August 2008
most recently cited

23 federal appellate · 14 district · 64 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 121 later decisions (5 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2008 · most notably Guinn v. United States (1915), Hannah Fitchie v. Cecil Brown O (1908)

23 federal appellate · 14 district · 64 state decisions — followed in 21 states

24019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Tifft v. . Porter · Towle v. Swasey · Souverbye v. Arden · Campbell v. Porter

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 121 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Williams says in reference to the different kinds of legacies that: “A legacy is general when it is so given as not to amount to a bequest of a particular thing or money of the testator, distinguished from all others of the same kind. A legacy is specific when it is a bequest of a specified part of the testator’s personal estate, which is so distinguished ... A legacy of quantity is ordinarily a general legacy; but there are legacies of quantity m the nature of specific legacies, as of such money, with reference to a particular fund for payment. This kind of legacy is called by the civilians a demonstrative legacy; and it is so far general, and differs so much in effect from one properly specific, that if the fund be called in or fail, the legatee will not be deprived of his legacy, but be permitted to receive it out of the general assets; yet the legacy is so far specific, that it will not be liable to abate with general legacies upon a deficiency of assets.” Vol. 2, p. 1158. And lie adds: “ Tlie courts in general are averse from construing legacies to be specific; and the intention of the testator, with reference to the thing bequeathed, must be clear.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““That the intention of the testator, expressed in his will, or clearly deducible therefrom, must prevail, if consistent with the rules of law. And another familiar rule is that the law prefers a construction which will prevent a partial intestacy to one that will permit it, if such a construction may be reasonably given. And' in principle this must be so when it is contended that the executor takes merely for next of kin claiming as distributees of an alleged undisposed of residue.” Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606 , 616, 21 Sup. Ct. 233 , 237 ( 45 L. Ed. 339 ).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The presumption is stronger that a testator intends some benefit to a legatee, than that he intends a benefit only upon the collateral condition that he shall remain till death, owner of the property bequeathed. The motives which ordinarily determine men in selecting legatees, are their feelings of regard, and the presumption of course is that their feelings continue and they are looked upon as likely to continue.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.