179 W. Va. 435 - State v. Armstrong’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Rule 611(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides: `The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.' This evidentiary rule is consistent with the common law in this State: `A trial court has wide latitude in the conduct of a trial, and particularly in matters pertaining to the examination of witnesses, and its rulings in relation to the examination of witnesses will not be reversed except when there has been a plain abuse of its discretion.' Syl. pt. 2, Payne v. Kinder, 147 W.Va. 352 , 127 S.E.2d 726 (1962). The discretion of the trial court to control the mode of interrogation of witnesses has been recognized in criminal cases in this State. See Syl. pt. 6, State v. Fairchild, 171 W.Va. 137 , 298 S.E.2d 110 (1982) (leading questions). In practice, abuse of this discretion is more often found when the trial court has unduly curbed the examination than when the trial court has permitted an undue extension of the examination. State v. Altergott, 57 Haw. 492, 506 , 559 P.2d 728, 737 (1977).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 189 W. Va. 470 - State v. Layton · 181 W. Va. 685 - State v. Plumley

2. “An increasing number of the courts and many of the leading commentators interpret Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical to our Rule 702, as limiting the Frye `general acceptance' test to a test solely for determining whether judicial notice can be taken of the scientific test's general reliability. See P. Giannelli and E. Imwinkelreid, Scientific Evidence §§ 1-5, 1-5(E)-(F), 1-6, 1-6(A)(D) (1986) (collecting authorities); Giannelli, General Acceptance of Scientific Tests — Frye and Beyond, in Scientific and Expert Evidence 11-32 (E. Imwinkelreid 2d ed. 1981). Therefore, according to this view, a scientific expert's testimony is admissible if shown to involve relevant scientific tests which assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, even if such tests and the underlying scientific principle(s) are not yet generally accepted in the particular scientific field.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 191 W. Va. 39 - Wilt v. Buracker

3. “7. In order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test. "8. There are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of time, such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 191 W. Va. 39 - Wilt v. Buracker