Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

18 Ariz. 19

Smith v. Mosbarger

Arizona Supreme Court

Decided March 13, 1916

Arizona Supreme Court · decided 1916-03-13

<p>1. Action — Joinder of Causes — Parties—Joint Tort. — Plaintiff properly joined in his aetion panties whom he alleged had combined and colluded together to defraud and cheat him out of his property, since they were charged with being joint wrongdoers in a common object.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Parol Evidence Affecting Writing — Fraud.—When parties competent to contract have reduced to writing the terms and conditions of their agreement, the law protects with great caution the written memorial of their contract thus made, and will permit its impeachment only for fraud or imposition.</p> <p>3. Contracts — Fraud—Degree of PIroof. — One challenging a written contract for fraud or mistake of fact must make his case by clear and convincing evidence, since written contracts are always presumed to be fair and honest in their inception and execution.</p> <p>4. Contracts — Avoidance for Fraud. — Where fraud or mistake is alleged as a ground for avoiding the stipulations of a'written contract, it must be made to appear, not that the party has made a bad bargain, but that he has been wrongfully or fraudulently induced to execute something contrary to what he thought to be his contract.</p> <p>5. Contracts — Validity — Mental Weakness. — Mere weakness of mind alone, without imposition or fraud practiced upon the party, forms no ground for vacating a contract; but if there is any unfairness in the transaction, such as gross inadequacy of consideration, the intellectual imbecility of the party may be taken into consideration to show such fraud as will afford ground for annulment.</p> <p>6. Contracts — Validity—Inability to Read. — Inability to read and understand the language in which a contract is negotiated, upon showing that its contents were misrepresented, justifies a court of equity in declaring it ineffective.</p> <p>7. Pleading — Demurrer—Admission.—A demurrer admits the allegations of the pleading to which it is opposed.</p> <p>8. Vendor and Purchaser — Fraud by Buyer. — Where the buyer of land, at request of the seller, who was feeble and unable to read English, read over the written contract between them, and, explaining it at the seller’s request, materially misrepresented its terms and that he had $1,800 in the bank to secure payments to the seller, and thereafter the seller delivered the conveyance to a bank officer to hold in escrow until the buyer should perform the conditions of the contract, which bank officer immediately transferred to the buyer without waiting for performance, taking a mortgage baek rto himself for the price, there were sufficient acts of fraud to entitle the seller to avoid the contract.</p> <p>9. Trial — By Court — Submission of Questions. — In a suit to cancel a deed, where the allegations of the complaint that plaintiff was in feeble health, illiterate and unable to read and understand English, were denied by the answer, as were allegations that defendant represented that by the .terms of the contract of sale plaintiff would receive such sums of money as he should require, and the whole purchase price within a year, and that defendant had on deposit in a bank $1,800 that he would pay as requested, appropriate questions embodying such issues should have been propounded and submitted to the jury by the court, since controverted questions of fact involved in an equity .case must be submitted to the jury.</p> <p>[As to when vendor may recover possession of the property from vendee, see note in 107 Am. St. Rep. 722.]</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded · Decided 1916-03-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently March 1984

12 state decisions

4019161920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

CUNNINGHAM, J. (Concurring).

¶1I concur in the decision reversing the case and remanding the cause for a new trial. My reasons therefor, briefly stated, are as follows:

¶2The appellants assigned as error the trial court’s refusal to submit, at their written request, to the jury twenty-two interrogatories prepared by them, for the alleged reasons the said interrogatories were necessary to decide the issues between the parties, and the court by such refusal denied the appellants the right to have the issues of fact submitted to the jury; in other words, denied the defendants due process of law.

¶3A careful examination of the said requested interrogatories convinces me that they are such in substance as do not tend to a determination of the controverted questions of fact arising in the course of the trial, with the exception of the ninth and tenth. The ninth interrogatory is thus stated:

“Did Smith promise to pay Mosbarger on said contract whenever Mosbarger should demand pay?”

¶4This assumes that a contract is established without dispute. It assumes the disputed issue as settled. The interrogatory was properly rejected for that reason.

¶5The tenth interrogatory is thus stated:

“Did Smith promise to pay the entire purchase price of the property involved within one year?”

¶6*30This goes to the gist of the issue. The answer to this interrogatory would tend to determine the ease. The court submitted no interrogatory of the like import as this requested by defendants.

¶7“In all actions where equitable relief is sought the court shall, if a jury be demanded by either party, submit to the jury all controverted questions of fact. Interrogatories shall-be framed and approved by the court presenting such questions, and each interrogatory shall be confined to a single question of fact and shall be so framed as to be answered by yes or no, and shall be so answered where yes or no is possible. In every such case the verdict shall be binding upon the court in the determination of the action, unless set aside and a new-trial granted on motion made for that purpose.” Paragraph 542, Civil Code of Arizona 1913.

¶8This statute calls for a special verdict in equity actions. This is an action where equitable relief is sought, and, a jury having been demanded, the court was required to instruct the jury to return a special verdict.

¶9Paragraph 538 of the Civil Code of Arizona of 1913 defines the special verdict, its office and the court’s duty upon receiving such verdict, as follows:

“The special verdict must find the facts as established by the evidence, and not the evidence by which they are established, and the findings must be such as that nothing remains for the court but to draw from such facts the conclusions of law. ’ ’

¶10These statutory requirements were not substantially observed by the court, and such failure constitutes reversible error. This necessarily includes my opinion that the complaint is sufficient in substance to authorize the granting of relief to plaintiff.

¶11I state no opinion relative to the other matters in support, of the judgment involved in the appeal.

/18/ariz/19 · .json · Public domain