¶1concurring. I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not in its reasoning. The reason I concur in the result is that the appellant did not object to the sentence imposed below on the grounds that it was not an authorized disposition under Arkansas law. He has, however, marginally raised the point before this Court by arguing that the appellant may not be liable for any additional sentence since he had completed the full one year sentence given him. As the Arkansas Supreme Court noted in Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986), Arkansas does not have a plain error rule, and therefore, we cannot consider a sentencing error, unobjected to at trial, on direct appeal. However, as the Court noted, the imposition of an improper sentence is a proper subject for a petition under Rule 37.
¶2However, in the case at bar, I am compelled to note my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the sentence imposed was authorized under our statutes. I have no real quarrel with the majority’s quotation of the applicable statutes; they are accurately reproduced; my problem is that the Arkansas Supreme Court has clearly said that the trial judge is without authority to modify a sentence in a criminal case once it is put into execution, Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983), and further, that multiple sentences in criminal cases are not allowed. Easley v. State, 274 Ark. 215, 623 S.W.2d 189 (1981). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Deaton v. State, 283 Ark. 79, 81, 671 S.W.2d 175, 177 (1984), “ ‘A person need run the gauntlet only once.’ ” (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 396 U.S. 711 (1985)). In the case at bar, it seems obvious to me that the appellant has been required to “run the gauntlet” twice.
¶3concurring. I concur in
¶4affirming the judgment of the circuit court in sentencing the defendant to an additional term of nine years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. However I would affirm without reviewing the merits for the reasons stated below.
¶5At the conclusion of a hearing for revocation of suspension of imposition of additional sentence under a prior felony conviction the court found that appellant had violated the condition of suspension by committing a felony and sentenced him to an additional term of nine years. On appeal the appellant argues for the first time that since he had already served the one year sentence imposed under the prior conviction he could not be sentenced to any additional time under the prior judgment in which the court suspended for five years the imposition of any additional sentence. Appellant further argues that if he is subject to receiving an additional sentence the length of sentence should be limited to five years on the ground that the written statement of the court respecting suspended sentence indicates any additional sentence would be limited to five years. The judgment for the prior conviction contained no such limitation.
¶6The issues appellant now raises were not raised by objection before the trial court. A.R.Cr.P., Rule 36.21 requires a defendant to make known to the trial court his objections to the action of the court and his grounds therefor. When the court announced the additional sentence appellant made no objection. The rule is well settled that the appellate court will not review alleged error unless an objection sufficiently specific to apprise the court as to the particular error complained of is timely made, and to be timely the objection must be made when the trial court is afforded an opportunity to correct the asserted error. Tosh v. State, 278 Ark. 377, 646 S.W.2d 6 (1983); Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 647 S.W.2d 419 (1983).
¶7In Coulter v. State, 269 Ark. 537, 597 S.W.2d 814 (1980), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a failure to object before the trial court will only be disregarded when the error is so great that it could not have been cured by the trial court and only then to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice. No such condition exists in the case before us.
¶8Also, I would not review the merits of the issues appellant argues on appeal for the reasons that appellant’s brief makes no convincing argument in support of his points and his points are not supported by any citation of authority. Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857, 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co, v. Hutcherson, 287 Ark. 247, 697 S.W.2d 907 (1985).