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← 18 F.3d 1560 - Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States

Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

18 F.3d 1560 · 1994

Citation profile

136
cited by 136 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
14
states following
October 2021
most recently cited

30 federal appellate · 2 district · 23 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 136 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2021 · most notably Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States (1995), Creppel v. United States (1994)

30 federal appellate · 2 district · 23 state decisions — followed in 14 states

6601994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 33 U.S.C. § 1344 · 5 U.S.C. § 701 · 5 U.S.C. § 706

Relies on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City · Village of Euclid Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co · Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon · Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council · Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 136 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[i]f a regulation categorically prohibits all economically viable use of the land -- destroying its economic value for private ownership -- the regulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent physical occupation. There is, without more, a compensable taking.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Nothing in the Fifth Amendment limits its protection to only ‘categorical’ regulatory takings, nor has the Supreme Court or this court so held. Thus there remains in cases such as this the difficult task of resolving when a partial loss of economic use of the property has crossed the line from a noncompensable ‘mere diminution’ to a compensable ‘partial taking.’”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “[W]hen the Government acts as the intermediary between private interests to provide a mutually beneficial environment from which all benefit and in which all can thrive, the shared diminution of free choice that results may not rise to the level of constitutionally required compensation. In addition, then, to a demonstration of loss of economic use to the property owner as a result of the regulatory imposition ... the trial court must consider: are there direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and others similarly situated, flowing from the regulatory environment? Or are benefits, if any, general and widely shared through the community and the society, while the costs are focused on a few? Are alternative permitted activities economically realistic in light of the setting and circumstances, and are they realistically available? In short, has the Government acted in a responsible way, limiting the constraints on property ownership to those necessary to achieve the public purpose, and not allocating to some number of individuals, less than all, a burden that should be borne by all?”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.