¶1An objection “is sufficient ... if ‘at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, [a party] makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objections to the actions of the court and his grounds therefor.’ ” Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 480, 405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) (en banc); see Code § 8.01-384.
¶2The defendant’s objection to the police investigator’s testimony was sufficient. Before the investigator testified, the defendant’s counsel objected to the proposed testimony because she anticipated that the expert would testify concerning the significance of the cocaine found and that this testimony would “pre-empt the jury’s determination of fact . . . which is whether there was an *288attempt to distribute.” The trial court overruled the objection without limiting the scope of the officer’s testimony. After the officer described his qualifications, defense counsel reiterated to the court that her “objection still stands.” The trial judge acknowledged her objection, and the witness was allowed to testify.
¶3The defendant’s objection met the requirements of Code § 8.01-384. The defendant made “known to the court ... his objections . . . and his grounds therefor” immediately before the witness testified. The trial judge understood the objection and overruled it. The grounds stated at trial for the objection are those now stated on appeal. Rule 5A:18 does not bar us from considering this issue on appeal.
¶4The majority concludes that the trial court correctly overruled the objection based on the prosecutor’s proffer of what the investigator’s testimony would be. I disagree.
¶5The prosecutor’s proffer did not limit the content of the investigator’s proposed testimony to “the relationship of scales, and Inositol and other cutting agents to the distribution of cocaine and the street value of the drug,” as the majority describes. In addition to those matters, the prosecutor proffered that the investigator “would testify to . . . personal use, what is heavy, what a person that uses cocaine by themselves — what they would use approximately.” Accordingly, the witness testified that 160 grams of cocaine would not be for personal use but would be for distribution. That inadmissible testimony, in my opinion, was within the scope of the prosecutor’s proffer.
¶6Furthermore, the trial court did not limit the scope of the witness’s testimony to that proffered by the prosecutor. Instead, after having had an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue, the trial court overruled the objection. If the trial court intended to overrule the objection, only with respect to that testimony described by the majority, it should have said so. Otherwise, the defendant’s counsel, having timely brought the objection to the court’s attention, was entitled to rely upon the court’s ruling.
¶7This decision puts in jeopardy a practice followed by many trial lawyers. Often, “[t]o avoid the need for repeated objections to a particular line of questioning, a lawyer may be able to make an early motion in limine or otherwise obtain a ruling that a single *289objection applies to the entire line of questioning.” Ellis J. Horvitz, Protecting Your Record on Appeal, 4 Litigation 35 (Winter 1978).
¶8Defense counsel did this. First, out of the presence of the jury and before the witness testified, she stated her objection and the grounds for it. Next, after the trial court had overruled the objection without any qualification, she reiterated the objection. While acknowledging the witness’s qualification, she said, “I would say that my objection still stands, if that’s okay.” The trial court, apparently agreeing, responded, “I understand.” This Court’s ruling ends this practice by requiring a lawyer to raise an objection repeatedly before each question, even after receiving an adverse ruling addressed to the entire testimony.
¶9The defendant’s objection to the testimony of the police investigator was, in my opinion, sufficient, and we should consider the propriety of that ruling on appeal. I agree with the majority that the testimony was inadmissible; therefore, I would reverse the conviction and remand the proceeding for a new trial.
¶10 I concur with the majority for the reasons it states that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the defendant’s admissions regarding other crimes.