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180 Cal. 430

181 P 645

Edwardson v. Hansen

California Supreme Court

Decided May 29, 1919

California Supreme Court · decided 1919-05-29

<p>[1] Estates op Deceased Persons—Will—Contingency op Death Prior to Testatrix—Intestacy.—A will entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testatrix and almost entirely written in the Danish language requesting that in the event of her death the will he sent to her brother, and that should he be dead, then her brother’s daughter and her deceased sister’s daughter should together sell all the property of the testatrix and divide it equally between the children of her deceased sister, and then providing for two specific money bequests to a niece and to a friend, makes the division of the property among the children of the deceased sister conditional upon the death of the brother before the death of the testatrix, and where the brother survived the testatrix the two specific bequests constituted the only effective disposition made by the will and as to the remainder of the estate the testatrix died intestate.</p> <p>[2] Id.—Construction op Wills — Intestacy not Favored. — Constructions of wills leading to intestacy, total or partial, are not favored and will he rejected when the language used reasonably admits of a construction that renders the will effective as to all the property of the decedent.</p> <p>[3] Id.—Intent op Testator — Language op Will.—While the language used in a will must be liberally construed with a view to carrying into effect what the will as a whole shows w-as the real intent of the testator, this intent must be found in the language, taking into view in cases of uncertainty arising upon its face the circumstances under which it was made.</p> <p>[4] Id.—Construction Based on Conjecture Prohibited.—Courts are not permitted, in order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy, to adopt a construction based on conjecture as to what the testator may have intended," although not expressed.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Only through speculation and conjecture may the construction contended for by appellants be confirmed. And this cannot be countenanced in view of the cardinal rule to the effect that in the interpretation of wills it is not the probable intent which may have existed in the mind of the testatrix which prevails, but only that which is expressed in the language of the will.” (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 Pac. 287 ].)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 107 Cal. App. 236 - Estate of Johnson

Relies on In Re Estate of Blake

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1919-05-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently December 1977 · most notably 11 Cal. 2d 108 - DeParcq v. O'Brien (1938), 35 Cal. 2d 26 - Estate of Akeley (1950)

51 state decisions

2401919192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

ANGELLOTTI, C. J.

¶1 This is an appeal from a decree of partial distribution. The only appellants are the four children of decedent’s deceased sister, Anna Mathieson, residents of the kingdom of Denmark, who claim that under a writing admitted to probate as the last will of decedent they are entitled to all of the estate of deceased except two legacies of five hundred dollars each. The lower court concluded that such writing was insufficient as a will or otherwise to dispose of the estate of decedent except as to the said two legacies, and that as to all of the estate over one thousand dollars so disposed of the decedent must be held to have died intestate. The effect of the decision is that except as to one thousand dollars to be paid on the two legacies, the estate of decedent will go, one-third to Hans Peter Nelson, surviving brother of decedent ; one-third to the three surviving children of her deceased sister, Bena G. Edwardson, one of whom is named Agnes; and one-third to the appellants here, the surviving children of her deceased sister Anna Mathiesen, these being all of her heirs at law.

¶2 The record is.such that we are bound by the finding of the lower court as to the contents of the will, which, the bill of exceptions shows, was entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the decedent and was almost entirely in the Danish language. The trial court by a finding unquestioned by any specification of insufficiency, declared the same to be in the words and figures following:

“San Francisco, October 5, 1915.
“I am writing these lines in case I should meet with an accident or in any other way die then it is my wish if my brother Hans Peter Nelson is alive send this letter to him. Should he.be dead then it is my wish that my brother’s *432 daughter Emma and my dead sister Bena’s daughter who lives in Chicago, her name is Agnes, shall together sell all my property and divide equally between my dead sister Anna’s children by the name Engeborg, Anna, Alfrida, and Otto, living in Copenhagen and Nakskov. It is my wish that my niece E'mma Nelson receive $500. extra for her taking care of me. It is also my wish that my friend Mrs. Rosa Friis shall be given $500.
“Mrs. Jennie Hoytema,
‘ ‘ 94 Sanchez Street.
“P. S.—My safe deposit box is in the Humboldt Savings Bank No. 295.”

¶3 The niece, Emma Nelson, referred to herein is the daughter of the brother, Hans Peter Nelson, who survived decedent.

¶4 The lower court was of the opinion that the testamentary-disposition so apparently made in favor of the children of the dead sister, Anna, was conditioned upon the death before her own death of her brother Hans Peter Nelson. [1] This view was upheld by the decision of Bepartment Two of this court, the opinion being written by Mr. Justice Lennon, and upon mature consideration we believe this to be the correct view.x We recognize that this construction results in almost total intestacy, in view of the fact that her brother survived decedent, and also that [2] constructions leading to. intestacy, total or partial, are not favored, and will be rejected when the language used reasonably admits of a construction that renders the will effective as to all the property of the decedent. [3] It is also an elementary rule in the construction of wills that the language used must be liberally construed with a view to carrying into effect what the will as á whole shows was the real intent of the testator. This intent, however, must be found in the language used in the will, taking into view in cases of uncertainty arising upon its face the circumstances under which it was made. (Civ. Code, sec. 1318.) [4] Courts are not permitted in order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a construction based on conjecture as to what the testator may have intended, although not expressed. In the case at bar we have a testatrix whose next of kin were a brother and the children of two deceased sisters. Her brother was her nearest relative. No reason whatever appears why in disposing of her property she should discriminate against him in favor of children of one or both of her deceased sisters. *433 Certainly in her very informal will she does not do so in plain and unambiguous terms. To the contrary, her first thought is of him, and her first expression of desire is “it is my wish if my brother, Hans Peter Nelson is alive, send this letter to him. ’ ’ No express direction or desire as to what is to become of her property in that contingency or what he is to do in the matter appears. It is as though in the mind of the testatrix this was to be the end of the whole matter. If we were at liberty to resort to conjecture as to the' intent we might well conclude from the language that she thought she was giving the property to him in this contingency or that he would then take the property as her nearest relative. It is only “should he be dead” that she has any desire to express in regard to the disposition of her property, and her desire in that contingency is that her dead brother’s daughter Anna, and her dead sister Bena’s daughter should sell the property and dispose of it in the way indicated. Appellants seek to make the primary object of the instrument the distribution of the property in any event in the manner specified in the portion commencing “should he be dead,” and to do this find it necessary to construe the directions to Emma and Agnes as being intended as applicable to the brother in the event that he survived decedent, although no such idea is expressed. It is sufficient to say that no such intention is expressed with reasonable certainty, and that under the circumstances any such conclusion would be based solely on conjecture. As was said in the department opinion: “Only through speculation and conjecture may the construction contended for by appellants be confirmed. And this cannot be countenanced in view of the cardinal rule to the effect that in the interpretation of wills it is not the probable intent which may have existed in the mind of the testatrix which prevails, but only that which is expressed in the language of the will. (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, [108 Pac. 287].) We are satisfied that the appellants cannot fairly be held to take anything under the will. By the decree they are adjudged their rightful share as heirs of deceased. No objection is made by them as to the allowance of the two legacies of five hundred dollars each, ,a matter apparently settled by the decree. All parties to the estate have acquiesced in their allowance.

¶5*434 It may be noted that appellants claim that the translation of the will embodied in the court’s finding is not entirely correct, ánd append to their brief what they call a “literal translation.” While we are bound by the translation found, we do not think that the so-called “literal translation” would materially help appellants. In the same connection respondents suggest that, properly translated, the provision as to the disposition of the property by Emma and Agnes is that they “shall together sell my property and share with [instead of divide between] Anna’s children, the Danish word “udele” used meaning “share” and not “divide.” This would produce the very natural and reasonable conclusion that even had the brother predeceased the decedent, appellants under the will could take only one-third of the property, and would entirely explain the use of the word “extra” in the five hundred dollar bequest to Emma Nelson.

¶6 The decree is affirmed.

¶7 Lennon, J., Wilbur, J., and Melvin, J., concurred.

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