Hardware Mutual Casualty v. Same’s Empirical Analysis
1942
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 11 district · 55 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 73 later decisions — most recently March 2015 · most notably Woodrich Construction Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America (1958), Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co. (1969)
3 federal appellate · 11 district · 55 state decisions — followed in 13 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. · Grant v. Knepper · State Ex Rel. Schiller v. Hecht Co. · Arcara v. Moresse · United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Williams
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““. . . It is argued that the words ‘person using,’ and ‘use,’ in the omnibus clause, refer to the actual driving of the car, not to taking the car out and controlling the trip while driven by another. But using a car in the ordinary acceptation of the words seems clearly to include a borrower’s making use of it by riding while driven by another. Mrs. Phillips was ‘still the director of the enterprise, still the custodian of the instrumentality confided to [her] keeping, still the master of the ship.’ . . .” 180 Md. at 607 (brackets in original).”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“1) Where coverage is extended by the omnibus clause only to persons using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured (or other designated person) coverage depends upon the scope of the permission granted. 2) In determining whether the scope of permission has been exceeded, Maryland has not adopted the strict rule, the liberal rule, or the minor deviation rule. However, Melvin supports by implication the minor deviation rule. 3) ‘Actual’ use with the permission of the named insured is ‘the particular use contemplated when permission is granted and relied on.’ 4) Such use and the operation of the car at the time of accident are not ‘synonymous,’ for using a ear by a borrower includes riding in it while another drives, at least where the former remains ‘the custodian of the instrumentality confided to his keeping,’ or the latter ‘is the agent or servant of another and subject to his immediate and present direction and control.’ 5) There is no case in Maryland squarely addressing the issue of whether a restriction upon the operation of the car, i.e., a prohibition against permitting a third person to drive it, is not a factor in determining whether the operation of the car is in accordance with the particular use contemplated when permission was granted and relied on. 6) Nevertheless, the thrust of Maryland decisions is that in determining whether the operation is within the permission required by the omnibus clause ‘one must examine the total facts,’ and the facts of p”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.