Berlin v. Robbins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘Where during the unity of title an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, which, at the time of the severance, is in use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the other, then upon a severance of such ownership, whether by voluntary alienation or by judicial proceedings, there arises by implication of law a grant or reservation of the right to continue such use.’ ””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cookson v. Duke · Keller v. Fitzpatrick

2. ““ ‘The degree of necessity is such merely as- renders the easement necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made. It is sufficient if full enjoyment of the property cannot be had without the easement, or if it materially adds to the value of the land. It has been contended that the use of the word “necessary” in these cases is misleading; that the so-called “necessity” upon which the judges rely is in fact no necessity at all, but a mere beneficial and valuable convenience. Certainly such use of the word must be distinguished from the sense in which it is employed in designating ways of necessity. Some courts have adopted as the test, whether the easement is one for which a substitute can be furnished by reasonable labor and expense; while others adopt the rule that the presence of no degree of necessity is requisite in order that the easement shall pass, that if an apparent and continuous quasi easement forms a part of the tenement conveyed, and adds to the value for use, it becomes an easement and passes with the conveyance.’ ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 33 Wash. 2d 151 - Evich v. Kovacevich · 30 Wash. 2d 266 - Bushy v. Weldon

3. ““Complainants, however, urge that, even if an easement existed by implied grant, a conveyance by "the former common owner of the servient tenement retained by him destroyed the easement and we are referred to [9] Ruling Case Law, Easements, §61 [now 17 Am. Jur., Easements, section 128]; 19 C. J. 940. It is true that the bona fide purchaser , of land without actual or constructive notice of existence of an easement may take the land relieved of its burden. When this occurs it is because the dominant tenant has failed to do something which he ought to have done. In the case at bar to whom could the dominant tenant give notice and when? Notice to the grantor was unnecessary because he himself laid the pipe. It can scarcely be contended that Coppen [owner of the dominant estate] was under a duty to know when the original, owner was negotiating for or making a sale of the servient tenement nor had he a duty to follow up mesne conveyances with notices of the easement to the purchasers. Smira’s [another dominant estate owner] situation was similar. Both Coppen and Smira had a legally established interest in the land which could not be taken away without their knowledge or some failure of duty on their part. No cases support complainant’s contention in this respect. Those cited by him relate either to unrecorded grants where record was required, parol licenses or cases where the easement was held not to be apparent. Once conceding the existence of an easement by severance of the quas”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McKeon v. Brammer