181 Md. App. 74 - Thompson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Matters relating to the character of the offense are those facts that must be proved to make the act complained of a crime." Tapscott v. State, 106 Md.App. 109, 134 , 664 A.2d 42 (1995). Consequently, the only change to an indictment that requires the consent of the parties is one that would alter the elements of the crime charged. And, thus, "[a]n indictment may be corrected without the defendant's consent if the amendment does not alter any of the elements of the offense and results in no prejudice." Tapscott, 106 Md.App. at 134 [, 664 A.2d at 54 ]. * * * We have repeatedly held that the date that an indictment alleges that the criminal conduct occurred "may be amended in the court's discretion without changing the character of the offense." Manuel [v. State], 85 Md.App. [1,] 18-19[, 581 A.2d 1287, 1295 (1990)]. See . . . Tucker v. State, 5 Md.App. 32, 35 , 245 A.2d 109 [, 111] (1968) (declaring that "[i]t is well-established that the State is not confined in its proof to the date alleged in the charging document"). Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in amending the date stated in the indictment. Nor does the amendment changing the location of the conduct charged from one address to another within Baltimore City change the character of the offense charged. In Makins v. State, 6 Md.App. 466, 470 , 252 A.2d 15, 17 (1969), we held that the trial court did not err in permitting the State to amend an indictment to reflect the correct address at which the alleg”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thompson v. State

2. “The primary policy consideration underlying the rule against other crimes evidence "is that this type of evidence will prejudice the jury against the accused because of the jury's tendency to infer that the accused is a `bad man' who should be punished regardless of his guilt of the charged crime, or to infer that he committed the charged crime due to a criminal disposition." Yet, in the area of sex crimes, particularly child molestation, "courts have been likely to admit proof of prior acts to show a party's conformity with past conduct." Professor McLain suggests that this relaxation of the general prohibition is "probably because the character evidence is believed to have greater probative value in those circumstances." In sex crimes cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim. Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the State offers evidence of prior sexual criminal acts of the same type by the accused against the same victim, the law of evidence already has concluded that, in general, the probative value, as substantive evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged, outweighs the inherent prejudicial effect. The discretion exercised by the trial judge in weighing unfair prejudice against probative value is concerned with special features in the particular case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thompson v. State

3. “[O]n my own initiative, I make this amendment finding it would not be a change in the character of the offenses. I would note that the character of the offense described by [the victim] . . . was substantially the same as that described in her written statement [to Detective Worts] of May 11th[, 2005,] which the Court has had an opportunity to review, and that her in-court testimony. . . differed from the indictments . . . only with respect to Thanksgiving and the location. I will moreover note that the defense has been aware of the location variance since before trial, because it was told to me prior to trial that her testimony with respect to the 1986 events [would be] that they occurred at [the] Goodnow Road [location] and not at the Lynview Avenue location. While it is unclear why the State has not made [a] motion [to amend the indictment] before . . . it should come as no surprise to the defense that the indictments were to be amended. I will also note that the Court is not [making] any . . . substantiative changes with respect to [the] indictments.. . . [C]hanging the date of the offense in the indictment constitutes a matter of form and not substance . . . and it may be amended in the Court's discretion without changing the character of the offense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thompson v. State