Volume 181 — United States Reports

Held: in legal effect, to be the voluntary act of the defendant carriers, and as a consequence the provisions of the third section of the act forbidding the., making or giving of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage will not apply.

<p>APPEALS PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

EBEOE TO THE.SÚPBEME COrTBT OE THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. The "West Chicago Park Commissioners, in virtue of authority vested in them by the laws of the State of Illinois, proposing to improve Douglas boulevard, and requiring a special assessment to enable them to pay for the work, applied, as the law directed in such case, to the municipal authorities of West Chicago to cause such special assessment to be levied and collected according to law.

<p>Brown v. Marion National Bank, 109 U. S. 416, followed on the point that “ if an obligee actually .pays usurious interest as such, the usurious transaction must be held to have occurred then, and not before, and he must sue within two years thereafter.”</p>

Held: that this came too late. The assertion that, although no Federal question was raised below, and although the mind of the state court was not directed to the fact that a right protected by the Constitution of the United States was relied on, nevertheless it is the duty of this court to look into the record, and determine whether the existence of such a claim was not necessarily involved, was unsound, as shown by…

Held: that this instruction correctly states the law. The plaintiff, in her proofs of loss, stated that the deceased came to his death by suicide, and to that effect was the verdict of the coroner’s jury.

<p>Where a married woman had resided in Arkansas for many years, and, just as she was leaving the State to join her husband, who had taken up his residence in Louisiana, was injured through the alleged negligence of the defendant railway company, and brought an action to recover damages in a state court in Arkansas, which, on the application of the company, was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States forthe WesternDis-trict of Arkansas, the rule of decision was the law of Arkansas, the place of the wrong, and of the forum, and not the law of Louisiana.</p> <p>By the law of Arkansas, plaintiff was entitled to bring the action in her own name and without joining her husband. And if her husband should subsequently bring suit in Louisiana on the same cause of action, it is not to be assumed that the courts of that State would not recognize the binding force of the judgment in Arkansas.</p> <p>By .the legislation of Arkansas the earnings of a married woman arising from labor or services done and performed on her sole account are her separate property, and although the statutes may not have deprived the husband of the services of the wife in the household, in the care of the family, or in and about his business, they have bestowed on her, independently of him, her earnings on her own account, and given her authority to acquire them.</p> <p>As the evidence in this case tended to show that plaintiff for some years had been carrying on business on her own account, which had been suspended by reason of temporary illness for a short time just previous to the accident, the Circuit Court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury that, if they found for the plaintiff, they might take into consideration in assessing her damages, among other things, her age and earning capacity before and after the injury was received, as shown by the proofs:</p> <p>On this record the earning capacity referred to presumably had relation to earnings on plaintiff’s own account, and if defendant wished this made more explicit, it should have so requested'.</p>

This case was brought here both by writ of error and appeal. As thereby as no trial by jury and the issues were only questions of law determined by the trial court on demurrer, the writ of error is dismissed, and the cause considered on the appeal.

This action was brought in the Common Pleas Court of Delaware County, Ohio, on a policy of insurance issued September 27, 1895, by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company on the life of George E. Warren and for the benefit of William M. Warren.

Held: That the alleged agreement with Piper was proved to have been just as stated by Hay; (2) That the failure of Piper to invest Hay with the legal title was such a wrong to the latter as entitled him to the protection which would *78 be given by a decree specifically declaring that the defendant holds the title in trust for him; (3) That such relief is consistent with the objects intended to be sub-served by the…

Held: when once settled in the courts of a State, are not subject to review in this court. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658 ; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188 ; Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad, v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 -242; Hed *104 rick v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fé Railroad, 167 U. S. 673 , 677; Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U. S. 362 .

The appellants in this case come hereon appeal from a judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims rejecting their claim, which arose under a grant of land in New Mexico called La Estancia grant, consisting of some 415,000 acres, made in 1845 by Governor Armijo to one Antonio Sandoval, under ivhom they claim. Upon the trial it appeared that Sandoval in 1845 was a Mexican citizen of high distinction residing in the Territory of New Mexico.

Held: it was his whole conduct relative to the transaction after it had been completed, and his affirmance of the contract that precluded any.right on his,part to recover for any alleged fraud.

The plaintiffs in error have brought this case here to review, the final judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirming the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County in favor of the defendants in error (plaintiffs below) in • an action of trespass involving the title to lands in that county on the south side of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.

Held: although the state court had rested its decision on the ground that there was no contract, in view of the previous decisions of this court and of the state court, relating to the contract which was under consideration, that the necessary effect of the ruling was in substance to give effect to an act of the legislature of Yirginia, passed subsequent to the contract, and which impaired its obligations.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a motion to dismiss or affirm. It was submitted on the 10th of December, 1900. On the 17th of that month, the consideration was ordered to be postponed until the record should be printed, or so much thereof as would enable the court to act understandingly without referring to the transcript.

Held: that this decree was a bar to the wife’s petition for a divorce in New York.

<p>A decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony, obtained in the State of Pennsylvania, in which neith¿r party is domiciled, upon service by publication and in another State, is entitled to no faith and credit in that State.</p> <p>A decree-for a divorce and alimony may be affirmed nunc pro tunc in casé of death of the husband after argument in this court.</p>

August Streitwolf and Elizabeth Streitwolf were married at New.Brunswick in New Jersey on June 3,1877, and lived there as husband and wife until August 3, 1896.

This was an action brought May 26, 1898, in the Supreme Court for the county and State of New York, on a decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey of December 28, 1897, by which it was ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the defendant the sum of $7840 for alimony at the rate of $80 per week from February 11, 1896, to the date of the decree, and the further sum of $80 per week permanent alimony from the date of the decree, the said weekly payments to be…

Held: that the purchaser had no title in the property superior to the bankrupt’s estate, and that the equities between him and the creditors ■ should be determined by the District Court, bringing in the assignee if necessary.

Held: herded or ranged within said infected districts, viz., the county of Cache, in the State of Utah; the county of Box Elder, in the State of Utah, and the county of Elko, in the State of Nevada, or which may hereafter be held, herded or ranged within said infected districts, for a period of sixty days from and after the date of this proclamation ; after the termination of said sixty days sheep can be moved into this…

Held: at the time the bank suspended and was put into the hands of a receiver, a certificate of the shares subscribed for by him; enjoyed, by receiving and retaining dividends, the rights of a shareholder; and appeared as a shareholder upon the books of the bank, which were open to inspection, as of right, by creditors.

, that “ to exempt the ship owner from liability it was not sufficient merely to shew that he had personally exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, but that it must be shewn that those persons whom he employed to act for him m *226 this respect had exercised due diligence;” and-that, therefore, the negligence of the ship’s carpenter prevented the exemption from applying, and the ship owner was liable.

<p>The Building Association, a corporation organized under the laws of New York, was authorized by law to make advances to its members. The statutory provisions regarding such advances and the securing of the same are stated in the opinion of the court. Bedford, a resident in Tennessee, became á shareholder by subscription to the stock, and by payment therefor.' The statutes of Tennessee authorized the corporation to do business in that State. Bedford, after subscribing to the stock, paid his.subscription, and on his application secured a loan from the corporation and mortgaged his property to secure it. All this was authorized by the statutes of Tennessee at the time when it was done. Subsequently a new statute was enacted, the provisions in which are set forth in the opinion of the court, and an act was passed concerning building associations, the parts of which thereof, relating to foreign building associations, are also set .forth in the opinion of the court. The Building Association subsequently filed its 'charter with the secretary of state of Tennessee, and an abstract of the same in the office of the Register of Shelby County, but it did not comply with the building association laws. Bedford de- . faulted in-his payments on the notes, and the association filed a bill in equity in the United States Circuit Court to foreclose the mortgage, and collect the amount due under his contract. Bedford answered that the notes and mortgage violated the laws of Tennessee, and were void. Held :</p> <p>(1) That Bedford’s subscription to the stock of the association, its issuance, and the application of a loan in pursuance of it, constituted a contract, which is inviolable by the state legislature.</p> <p>(2) That by his subscription to the stock of the association, Bedford became a member of it, bound to the performance of what its by-laws and charter required of him, and entitled to exact the performance of what the by-laws and charter required of the association.</p> <p>This court recognizes the power of a State to impose conditions upon foreign corporations doing business within the State, but that cannot be exercised to discharge the citizens of the State from their contract obligations.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. '</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that this statute, as construed and applied, in this case, is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. The prevention of disease is the essence of a quarantine law. Such law is *249 directed not only to the actually diseased, but to what has become exposed to disease. This case involves tbe constitutionality of certain quarantine regulations of the State of Texas.

On September 18, 1899, S. Y. White brought an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York against Charles H. Treat, United States collector of internal revenue, to recover the sum of $604, alleged to have been unlawfully exacted by such collector. The action was removed to the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, and a judgment there rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 100 Fed. Rep. 290.

Held: defendants below could not deny the validity of these locations, the estoppel covered the objection to the right to locate a lode claim within a placer claim previously located, and the objection based on the supposed effect of the patenting of the placer claim, as raised on this record. And whether a party is estopped or not is not a Federal question.

This was a petition for a writ of certiorari requiring the Uni-téd States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to certify to this court for its review and determination the case of the American Sugar Refining Company, Plaintiff in Error, v. The City of New Orleans, Defendant in Error, No. 920, November Term, 1899 ; or in the alternative for a writ of mandamus to command the judges of said court to hear, try and adjudge said cause.

STATES E0R THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA. On March Y, 1900, plaintiff in error was convicted in the District Court of. the United States for the District of Minnesota on the charge of issuing as agent of the Northern Pacific Railway Company an export bill of lading upon certain wheat exported from Minnesota to Liverpool, England, without affixing thereto an internal revenue stamp, as required by the act of June 13, 1898, e. 448, 30 Stat. 448.

Held: against the contention of the'lot owners, that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the Uilited States were not applicable in the case; and our jurisdiction enables us to inquire whether the Supreme Court of Missouri were in error in so holding.

Congress, by an act approved March 3, 1899, entitled “An act to extend S street in the. District of Columbia, and for other purposes,” 30 Stat. 1344, c. 431, enacted as follows: “ Section 1.

This was the case of a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York on September 9, 1899, by James B. Lyon, a citizen of the State of New York, against the town of .Tonawanda, a municipal corporation of that State, and John K. Patton, supervisor of said town.

This was an action brought By Mortimer Webster in the district court in and for the county of Cass and State of North Dakota, against the city of Fargo ; James M. Fargo, as auditor of said city; D. C. Eoss, as treasurer, and G. J. Olson, as auditor, of Cass County, in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from enforcing an assessment for grading and paving against certain lots or pieces of land belonging to the plaintiff, and abutting on the streets of the city…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Cass Farm Company v. Detroit, ante, 396, followed in holding that it was not the intention of the Fourteenth Amendment to subvert the systems of the States pertaining to general and special taxation; that that amendment legitimately operates to extend'to the citizens and residents of the States the same protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress; and Federal courts ought not to interfere when what is complained of is the enforcement of the settled laws of the State, applicable to all persons in like circumstances and conditions, but only when there is some abuse of law, amounting to confiscation of property, or deprivation of personal rights, as was instanced in the case of Nor-wood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>BRROR TO THE SUPREME' COURT OE THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OE APPEALS POR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCÜIT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO. ’</p> <p>Ik September, 1892, the Electric Supply Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of Connecticut, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio a bill of complaint against the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Pailway Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of Ohio. It was alleged in the bill that the ■ plaintiff company had, in June, 1872, sold and delivered to the defendant company certain materials and supplies to be used in the erection of the lighting apparatus, powerhouse, statiqn and railway of the defendant, of the value of $2787.04, and that said supplies and material were used in the construction of the lighting apparatus and railway of said defendant, situated in Put-in-Bay Island, in Ottawa County, Ohio, and that the entire amount of said claim was due and unpaid.</p> <p>The bill further alleged that, on September 7, 1892, the plaintiff company had filed with the recorder of Ottawa County an affidavit containing an itemized statement of the amount and value of the materials and supplies furnished under said contract of sale, with a statement of the account and terms of payment to be made thereunder and a description of the premises upon which said lighting apparatus and railway were located, which said statement and all connected therewith were duly recorded by said recorder in a book kept for that purpose; that the plaintiff has a lien on the premises and all the property of defendant company from the 7th day of June, 1892, for the amount due with interest; and that, in the premises, the plaintiff was entirely without remedy according .to the strict rules of- the common law, and could only have relief in a court of equity where matters of such a nature were properly cognizable and reviewable.</p> <p>The bill further alleged that the Railway Equipment Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of Illinois; John Arbuckle, Charles Ryan and W. J. Ryan, citizens of the State of Ohio; James IL Tillotson, a citizen of-the State of Ohio; the Cleveland Electrical Manufacturing Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of Ohio; the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of New York; John P. Carrothers, a citizen of the State of New York; and H. H. Warner, a citizen of the State of New York, claimed to have some interest in the premises upon which the plaintiff claimed the aforesaid lien; and the bill prayed that each of said parties should be required to appear and set up their respective claims, or be forever barred from setting up the same against the plaintiff. ■ The bill prayed for an account with the defendant company, and for a decree of sale of said premises, etc.</p> <p>On September 10, 1892, an answer and cross bill were filed by J. K. Tillotson. In this cross bill it was alleged that said Tillotson had built and equipped the railroad of the defendant company, and had received in payment therefor the stock of said company and mortgage bonds to the amount of $125,000 ; that he had contracted with John P. Carrothers and II. II. Warner, as owners and controllers of the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company of New York, (named as defendants in the bill of complaint,) to sell and dispose of said stock and bonds, but that said Carrothers and Warner had not sold or accounted for the said stock or bonds, but that said Carrothers, claiming to be the owner of the capital stock of said defendant company, had elected himself president thereof, and had taken possession of said railroad, etc. It was thereupon prayed, in said cross bill, that a restraining order should be issued against said Car-rothers and Warner and the said Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company, forbidding them, during the pendency of this suit, from selling or disposing of said stock and bonds, and that the court should appoint a receiver to take charge and custody of the railway and property in plaintiff’s bill of complaint described, with instructions to care for atjd operate the same under the order of the court, and as, in the judgment of the court, might be for the interest of all parties concerned.</p> <p>Thereupon, on September 10, 1892, a subpoena was issued summoning said Carrothers, Warner and the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company to appear and answer said cross bill. On the same day a temporary restraining order was issued against said Carrothers and Warner as prayed for in the cross bill, and one L. S. Baumgardner was appointed receiver, .who gave a bond as such receiver in' form and amount approved by the United-States District Judge.</p> <p>The United States marshal made return that he had served the restraining order and subpoena .on said John P. Carrothers, and that said Ii. H. Warner and the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company were not found.</p> <p>Subsequently, on September 26,1892, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bail way Company filed an answer to the bill of complaint, admitting that on June 7,1892, the defendant had entered into a contract with the complainant company, whereby the latter company was to sell and deliver certain materials to be used in the construction of defendant’s railway in Ottawa County, Ohio. The said answer contained the following allegations :</p> <p>“ This defendant says that it is not true that Exhibit ‘A’ attached to complainant’s bill contains a true and correct statement of the material so sold by the complainant to this defendant as aforesaid. And it is not true that all of said supplies and materials contained in said Exhibit ‘ A ’ were used in the construction of the said railway. But, on the contrary, this defendant says that a large part of said materials were sold and delivered to said J. If. Tillotson, defendant, for the purpose of being used, and which were used, in the construction of certain property known as Hotel Victory on South Bass Island. This defendant says that it is not true that the material sold to this defendant by said ■ complainant as aforesaid were of the value of $2787.04, as set forth in said Exhibit ‘ A,’ but on the contrary this defendant is informed and believes, and so states the fact to .be, that the materials so sold by said complainant to this defendant, through its vice president, the defendant Tillotson, for the purpose of being used in the construction of said railway, and which were so used, amounted in value to about the sum of $700, and no more. . . . This defendant further says that the said complainant, when it sold the said Tillotson the material set forth in Exhibit ‘ A ’ of said complaint, well knew that a large part of said material was so sold and delivered for tbe purpose of being used, and was used, in tbe construction of Hotel Yictory, of wbicb tbe said Tillotson was president, and which had no connection whatever with this defendant’s railroad. And this defendant alleges that said complainant, at the request of said Tillotson, procured a lien to be filed with the recorder of Ottawa County against this defendant’s property, on the day previous to the filing of the complainant’s complaint herein, and for the entire amount of the material sold this defendant and also sold to said Tillotson for the use of said Hotel Yictory. And said lien was so filed by said complainant at the request of said Tillotson, for said amount, and for the express,purpose of instituting this action in this court.</p> <p>“ And this defendant prays that this honorable court may take an account of material sold by complainant to and for the use of the defendant, to be used in the construction of said railway, and the amount of said material so sold, which has been actually used in the construction thereof. And that the court may determine the value of .said material so sold to and used by this defendant, and the actual amount of the lien which said' complainant has on account thereof against the property of this defendant.”</p> <p>On September 26, 1892, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Pail way Company filed an answer to the cross bill of Tillot-son, admitting some' and denying many of the allegations .thereof, and containing the following allegation:</p> <p>“ This answering defendant further says that on or about the 3d day of September, 1892, the said defendant Tillotson, attempting to interfere with the said company in the operation of its said railway, and to prevent the said company from the peaceable enjoyment of its said property, the common pleas court of Ottawa County, Ohio, on the petition of said Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company, issued a restraining order enjoining the said defendant James K. Tillotson from interfering or attempting to interfere in any manner with the said company in the operation of its railway, and which said restraining order is still in full force and effect.”</p> <p>It also appears that the defendant company sued out of the court of common pleas a writ of replevin against Tillotson, but it is not shown what the property levied on was.</p> <p>Afterwards, on September 30,1892, the answer and cross bill of Arbuclde, Ryan & Company, who had been named as defendants in said suit, was tiled, in which it was, among other things, alleged that said firm had furnished a large amount of machinery and of labor for the said Put-in-Bay "Waterworks, Light and Railway Company, which went into the construction of said railroad and powerhouse of said company, on which there was unpaid and due to the said Arbuclde, Ryan & Company a balance of $11,153.60, and for which they had filed, on August 17, 1892, with the recorder of Ottawa County, Ohio, an affidavit and itemized account, by virtue of which proceeding they had obtained a lien upon the property and railroad of the defendant, the said railroad company. They therefore prayed for an account, and for an order directing the sale of the said property and railroad, and for the payment of their claim out of the proceeds of such sale.</p> <p>On October 15, 1892, L. S. Baumgardner, theretofore appointed receiver, filed a petition showing cause why certain expenditures incident to the care and preservation of the railroad and its property since they had come into his hands, and other expenditures necessary to be made, required him to raise a-sum of not less than $5000, and prayed for leave to issue receiver’s certificates for that purpose. This was followed by an order of the court authorizing the receiver to issue certificates to the amount of $5000, and declaring said certificates to be á first lien upon all the property of said railway company in the hands of said receiver.</p> <p>Afterwards, on October 29, 1892, a motion to discharge the receiver was made on behalf of the defendant railway company, which was accompanied by an affidavit of J. P. Carrothers, as president of said company, in which, among other things, it was stated that on September 3,1892, the affiant, as president of said company, was compelled to and did institute replevin proceedings to obtain possession of the personal property of said company, and that by virtue of said action the property of said company was turned over to affiant as president thereof, excepting the books, papers, muniments of title and certain other of the personal property belonging to said company which were taken away and secreted by said Tillotson; and that said railway company obtained from the court of common pleas of Ottawa County a restraining order enjoining Tillotson from interfering with the company’s peaceable enjoyment of the possession and control of said Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bail way Company, its property and business, such order to-take effect upon the plaintiff giving an undertaking, as provided by law, in the sum of $5000, to the satisfaction of the clerk of said court.</p> <p>Afterwards, on November 12, 1892, an affidavit of one F. S. Terry, as manager and attorney of complainant company, was filed in the present case, in which, among other things, it was stated that the Electric Supply Company was induced to include all sums due for material furnished for use of the Hotel Yictory Company in its account against said railroad-; that the amount actually used in the construction of the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company amounted to $861.23; that the balance of said material, to the amount of $1925.81, was used inside of said Hotel Yictory; that all of said material was ordered by said defendant Tillotson, as vice president of said defendant corporation, and was charged upon the books of the plaintiff corporation to the said Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company.</p> <p>On December 22,1892, the court overruled the motion to dismiss the receiver and to modify the order to said receiver to issue certificates; and an order was made, on the further petition of the receiver, allowing him to issue additional certificates to the amount of $5000.</p> <p>On January 20, 1893, an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court overruling the motion to discharge the injunction and to modify the order authorizing the receiver to issue certificates, and retaining jurisdiction, was taken by the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company, a corporation of New Jersey, and one of the defendants in the cause, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; and, on June 22,1893, that court reversed the decree of the Circuit Court, the injunction was dissolved and the cause was remanded to the Circuit Court with directions for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 58 Fed. Rep. 732, 746.</p> <p>On December 14,1893, the Circuit Court, in pursuance of the mandate from the Circuit Court of Appeals, dissolved the injunction theretofore granted on the cross bill of Tillotson, and, on December 28, 1893, appointed Irvin Belford a special master commissioner for the purpose of examining the accounts of the receiver, with particular reference to the disposition made by him of the proceeds of the certificates, and also to report the expenses found by the master to have accrued to the defendants, or any of them, and the reasonable compensation to which the receiver was entitled, etc.</p> <p>On March 31, 1894, Irvin Belford, the special master, filed his report in the Circuit Court, in which he found that the receipts of the receiver from all sources amounted to the sum of $12,230.90, whereof $8776.10 were from proceeds of receiver’s certificates, and his expenditures amounted to the sum of $11,969.58, leaving a balance of cash on hand of $261.32. The master further found that the reasonable compensation to which the receiver was entitled was $2200; of which $1200 were for his personal services, and $1000 for his attorney’s fees. He also found that the expenses and costs incurred by the defendant, the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company, consisting principally of attorney’s fees, amounted to the sum of $8795.25.</p> <p>Subsequently, on June 12, 1894, the Circuit Court made the following order:</p> <p>“ This day this cause came on for further hearing upon the motion of the Industrial and Mining Guaranty Company, the Put-in-Bay "Waterworks, Light and Railway Company and John P. Carrothers, to dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction. And the court, having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and being now fully advised in the premises, does grant said motion conditionally.</p> <p>“ It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that, upon the payment into court of the amount due on the certificates issued by L. S. Baumgardner, heretofore appointed receiver herein, or the filing herein of said certificates, duly paid and cancelled on or before the 30th day of June, 1894, and the payment to the clerk of this court of the costs in this case, including the compensation of the receiver, which is now taxed at the sum of $1200.00, and the compensation of receiver’s' counsel, which is now taxed at the sum of $1000, said cause be, and the same is, hereby dismissed.”</p> <p>On December 5, 1894, Arbuckle, Eyan & Company moved the court to dismiss the cause in compliance with the order previously made that said cause be dismissed when the receiver’s certificates were paid, because, as alleged, that said certificates have been paid in full, hut that Walker P. Hall and James E. Hutton, the holders of said certificates, have failed and refused to bring the same into court to have them cancelled, etc.</p> <p>On March 1, 1895, the following order was entered :</p> <p>. “ This cause came on to be heard 'on the motion of Arbuckle, Eyan & Company to compel the holders of the receiver’s certificates heretofore issued under the orders of this court herein to deliver them up to be cancelled and to dismiss. said cause; the order to Walker P. Hall and James E. Hutton to show cause why said receiver’s certificates should not be cancelled; the answer of Walker P. Hall to said citation to show cause, and the evidence was argued by counsel; and the court, being fully advised in the premises, finds that the said Walker P. Hall purchased said certificates for full value and in good faith, relying upon the orders of this court and is the present owner and holder thereof; that the same have not been paid, nor has anything been paid to "the said Walker P. Hall on account thereof, and that they are still a first lien upon all of the property and franchises of the defendant company, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Eail way Company, and that said cross petitioners are not entitled to have said cause dismissed until said receiver’s certificates and expenses and the costs of this cause are paid in full.”</p> <p>On October 5, 1895, a motion was made by the Put-in-Bay. Waterworks, Light and Eail way Company to dismiss said action and to direct the receiver theretofore appointed to forthwith deliver the property of the company in his possession and under his control, etc.</p> <p>On May 6, 1896, Judge H. F. Severens entered an order fixing May 14 for the hearing of said motion, and further ordering that any other party or parties who might be-interested in the action of the court to be taken upon said motion should have leave to intervene, and be heard at said hearing.</p> <p>On June 4, 1896, Judge Severens entered an order containing, among other things, the following:</p> <p>“ I am further of the opinion that the motion heretofore made upon the petition of the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Kailway Company, directing the receiver to surrender the property in his hands and dismissing the suit, should be denied, my opinion being that there are certain charges incurred in the receivership, the extent of which is not now determined, which must be ascertained and satisfied before the property can be released and the case dismissed, even if the case be dismissed and the property surrendered, this order, however, to be without prejudice to a renewal of a like application and motion when the situation of the case shall be ripe for a dismissal.”</p> <p>On June 25, 1896, the defendant company filed another petition, renewing its motion that the receiver should be directed to surrender to the company the property in his possession, which petition contained, after certain recitals, the following paragraphs:</p> <p>“ Your petitioner further represents that it is ready and willing and hereby tenders to the court a good and sufficient bond for the. payment of all charges incurred in said receivership that may be finally determined a first and prior lien upon the property of your petitioner.</p> <p>“ Wherefore your petitioner prays that an order may be entered in this cause directing the receiver to forthwith deliver to your petitioner all of the property of your petitioner of every kind and description now in his custody or under his control by virtue of his appointment as receiver aforesaid, upon the filing by your petitioner of the bond hereinbefore tendered and the approval thereof by the court. . . . 'Your petitioner further prays that a reference be had for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the charges incurred by the receiver herein with particular reference as to the disposition made by the receiver of the proceeds of the receiver’s certificates heretofore issued in this action, the purposes for which, the persons to whom and the dates the same were made; that said reference shall include the ascertainment of any other charges made in said'receivership and the purposes for which the same were created.”</p> <p>Whereupon, on July 15, 1896, Judge Severens entered an order granting the railway’s petition for restoration of property upon giving a bond of $20,000, to be approved by the clerk of the court, for the use and benefit of the parties who might hereafter be entitled thereto, and providing that the obligors of said bond should bind themselves to secure the payment of all charges incurred in the receivership in this action, including his certificates aforesaid, which might finally be determined to be a lien upon the property of said railway company, and should, in giving this bond, submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court to the end that the court might make such bond effectual for the collection of said charges by order or decree in this cause, etc.</p> <p>On April 17, 1897, the following'order was entered :</p> <p>“It appearing under the decree ordered herein on July 15, 1896, providing for a restoration of the property in the hands of the receiver, L. S. Baumgardner, heretofore appointed in this cause, to the defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bailway Company, upon the said company filing a bond as provided in said decree, and further under the decree of January 6, 1897, extending the time for the filing of said bond to March 1, 1897, that said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bail way Company, has not filed said bond:. Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the said decree of July 15, 1896, be and it is hereby set aside and held for naught.”</p> <p>Several further motions were made not necessary now. to mention, and finally on January 31, 1898, the court filed an opinion finding that there was not a sufficient available fund in the hands of the receiver with which to satisfy the receiver’s certificates and other necessary charges, and that it was peces-sary to sell the railroad and other real estate and fixtures belonging to the works of the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bailway Company, in order to raise a fund necessary to completely satisfy the charges, and accordingly directed notice to be given to the several intervening parties.</p> <p>Pending these proceedings, the Atlantic Trust Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of New York, on March 7, 1898, asked and obtained leave to.file an intervening petition or complaint against the defendant railway company, wherein it was alleged that said intervening company was the holder as trustee of certain bonds of said railway company aggregating $125,000, secured by a deed of trust or mortgage, bearing date June 16, 1892, on all the property, railroad and franchises of said railway company; that said bonds were in default and unpaid; and thereupon prayed that said mortgage be declared a lien on said property and be foreclosed.</p> <p>On November 21, .1898, the Put-in-Bay "Waterworks, Light and Kail way Company filed a demurrer to the intervening petition of the Atlantic Trust Company, which demurrer was on January 31, 1899, overruled.</p> <p>On December 12, 1899, the Circuit Court, lion. Horace H. Lurton, Circuit Judge, and Hon. Henry F. Severens, present, entered an order containing, among other things, the following:</p> <p>“ It appearing to the court that there has been filed in this cause no plea or answer to the intervening petition of the defendant Atlantic Trust Company, or to its amendment thereto, and that each and every of the defendants and the complainant are in default thereof: Now, therefore, on this 12th day of December, 1899, came the said Atlantic Trust Company, by its solicitors, H. Van Campen, Jr., and S wayne, Hayes and Tyler, and on its motion, it is ordered that the said intervening petition and amendment thereto be taken pro oonfesso as to all parties to this action — reserving, however, to the defendant, the Bodefield Belting Company, without further pleading herein, the right to present for the further consideration of the court and its orders thereon all or any question as to the priority of the lien claimed by said the Bodefield Belting Company over the said lien of said Atlantic Trust Company.”</p> <p>And thereupon, on the same day, Irvin Belford was appointed as special master to ascertain and report-the number and ownership of bonds secured by said mortgage, and tbe amount of principal and intei est due thereon.</p> <p>On December 15,1899, the Circuit Court, present Hon. Horace H. Lurton, Circuit Judge, and Hon. Henry F. Sevefens, District Judge, entered the following decree or order of sale :</p> <p>“ It being made to appear to the court that there is now past due and unpaid on the receiver’s certificates heretofore issued under the order and direction of the court in this case the sum of $7996.10, which amount represents the balance due on all of said certificates now outstanding up to this date and shall bear interest hereafter at seven per cent, ali of which certificates have been deposited' with the clerk of this court, and which amount and the costs of this case taxed and taxable against the defendant the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Kail way Company, to wit, the sum of §-, the court finds are the first and best lien on all the property of the said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Kailway Company, and there being no income or moneys available in the hands of the receiver sufficient to provide for the payment of said certificates and costs, it is accordingly ordered, adjudged and decreed that unless said defendant or sonic party in interest pay or cause to be paid to the clerk of this court the amounts so as aforesaid found due for receiver’s certificates and the costs, as aforesaid,- together with the sum of §15,033.44, being the amount due as found by this court in a prior order in this case .on the amended intervening petition of Arbuokle, Ryan & Company, with interest computed to the date of this decree, and the sum of $784.85, being the amount found due in a prior order of this court on the intervening petition of Barbour & Starr, with interest computed to the date of this decree, and the sum of $486.88, being the amount found due in a prior order of this court on the intervening petition of the Bodefield Belting Company, with interest computed to the date of this decree, within thirty days from the date of this decree, all of tlie property of the defendant, tlie Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light a'nd Kail way Company, hereinafter more specifically described, and all of the right, title, and interest and equity of redemption; of said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company, and each and every party to this action in and to the said property and in and to all property which has since the date of the filing of the petition herein been acquired by said the Put-m-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company or by the receiver appointed by this court or which may hereafter be acquired prior to the sale hereinafter provided for, shall be offered for sale and sold by and under the direction of Mathias A. Smalley, who is hereby appointed special master for the purpose, in the manner hereinafter directed, to satisfy the amounts due, as aforesaid, for said receiver’s certificates, and costs, and also to satisfy the amounts found due as aforesaid, on the amended intervening petition of Arbuckle, Ryan & Company and the intervening petitions of Barbour & Starr and the Bodefield Belting Company, and that the property ordered to be sold under this decree shall be sold in accordance with the course and practice of this court at public sale to the highest bidder for cash, at the courthouse of Ottawa County, Ohio, at Port Clinton, in said county, being the county in which said property is situate, and that notice of the time and place of such sale shall be given by said Mathias A. Smalley, special master, as aforesaid, by advertisement thereof published once a week for at least four weeks prior to said sale in at least one newspaper printed, regularly issued, and having a general circulation in said Ottawa County, which said notice shall, describe the property to be sold.</p> <p>“ It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said special master in making such sale shall first offer for sale all the right, title, and interest of the defendant the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company in and to the railroad, so called, of the said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company, including therein the line of railway cars, motors, apparatus, tracks, side tracks, switches, turnouts, poles, wires, and other apparatus, together with the franchises, easement, and rights of way connected therewith or appurtenant thereto, not part of, however’, or belonging to' the powerhouse property, so called, hereinafter described, provided that no bids for said above-described property, when thus offered separately, shall be received for less than a sum equal to the amounts found due, as aforesaid, upon receiver’s certificates and the costs hereinbefore provided; and provided further, however, and it is hereby ordered, that if within thirty days from the date of this decree the said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Kailway Company, or any party in interest herein, pay or cause to be paid to the clerk of this court the amount so, as aforesaid, found due on said receiver’s certificates, together with the costs of this action, as hereinbe-fore adjudged, then said marshal shall not expose or offer for sale under this decree the railroad property as above described. In case said railroad property, so called and above described, shall be separately offered for sale under the above terms of this decree and the amount bid therefor shall equal the amount of said receiver’s certificates and costs aforesaid, then said special master shall sell the aforesaid property to the highest and best bidder therefor,, and thereupon shall next offer for sale and sell to the highest and best bidder for cash all the right, title, and interest of the defendant the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light g,nd Kailway Company in and to the remainder of the property of the said the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Kail way Company, to wit, the powerhouse property, so called, being lots numbers four hundred and seventy-one (411), four hundred and seventy-two (472), four hundred and seventy-three (473), four hundred and seventy-four (474), and four hundred and seventy-five (475) of Victory Park addition, in Put-in-Bay or South Bass Island, Ottawa County and State of Ohio, together with all the buildings and appurtenances thereon, including the plant, machinery, apparatus, and fixtures attached to or contained in said buildings or either of them, provided that no bid for said, powerhouse property as above described shall be received for less than $10,000.</p> <p>“ It is further ordered that if in accordance with the terms of this decree, as hereinabove set forth, separate offer of the aforesaid railroad company, so called and as hereinabove described, shall be made, and the sum bid therefor shall not, however, be equal to the amount found due, as aforesaid, upon said receiver’s certificates and the costs aforesaid, then separate sale thereof shall pot be made, but in lieu of >said offer of the'remainder of the property of said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Kailway Company, as provided' by the terms of this decree hereinabove set forth, said special master shall forthwith offer for sale and sell for cash to the highest and best bidder therefor all the property of the said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company above described, including both the railroad property, so called, and the powerhouse property so called, as hereinabove described, as a unit, but no bid therefore as a unit shall be received for less than $16,500.</p> <p>“ It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said special master return the proceeds of said or any of said sales into the registry of this court, to be there held subject to the further order of this court.</p> <p>“ Itps further ordered and directed that the said special master malm report of his acts and doings under this decree with all convenient speed after said sale or sales shall have taken place.</p> <p>“ The court hereby reserves for further consideration as between Atlantic Trust Company and the Bodefield Belting Company any and all questions arising between them as, to the priority of their respective liens, and the court further expressly reserves for its further consideration all matters not herein expressly provided for.”</p> <p>On March 2,1900, the-report of M. A. Smalley, special master in chancery, was filed, showing that on February 24, 1900, he had sold to J. W. and C. W. Ryan, at public auction, for the sum of $16,501, all the property of the said -defendant, the Put-in-Bay W aterwor ks, Light and Rail way Company; and on March 8, 1900, the court approved the said report and sale nisi ; and on March 26, 1900, no exceptions or objections to the sale having been filed by any of said parties, it was ordered that the said order confirming.said sale was made .absolute, and the special master directed to immediately execute a deed for the property so sold by him to .the purchasers'.</p> <p>On June 8,1900, an-order or decree of distribution was made, containing, among other things, the following:</p> <p>• “ This-day came Arbuckle, Ryan & Company, the Bodefield Belting Company, Barbour & Starr, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company, Walker P. Hall, L. S. Baumgardner, receiver, and Atlantic Trust Company, by tbeir respective counsel, and thereupon this cause was heard upon the motion of Walker P. Hall for an order releasing the bond by him heretofore given conditioned for the repayment of any moneys by him received from the receiver herein should he be ultimately found not entitled thereto.</p> <p>“ In consideration whereof the court, being duly advised in the premises, doth find that the condition of said bond has been fully satisfied, and that the same should be cancelled and discharged, but retained in the custody of the court.</p> <p>“ It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that said bond be, and the same hereby is, cancelled and discharged, and the said Walker P. Hall and his surety are hereby released from any and all liability thereon.</p> <p>“ And thereupon this cause was further heard upon the motion of the said Walker P. Hall for an order of the court directing the clerk to pay the said Walker P. Hall out of the moneys in the registry of the court and arising from the sale of the property of said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bailway Company, the sum of $2400, claimed to have been paid by him on the 28th day of July, 1894, to said L. S. Baumgardner, as receiver, in liquidation of the allowances theretofore made said receiver and his counsel, together with certain expenditures by said receiver made, and was argued by counsel.</p> <p>“ In consideration whereof the court, being duly advised in the premises doth find that said motion is not well taken and should be denied.</p> <p>“ It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that said motion be, and the same hereby is, overruled at the costs of said Walker P. Hall.</p> <p>“ Thereupon this cause was further heard upon the fifth and final report of said receiver, L. S. Baumgardner, heretofore appointed herein, and was submitted to the court.</p> <p>“ In consideration whereof and upon examination thereof the court finds the same to be, in all respects, true and correct, and it is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the same be, and it is hereby, approved and confirmed.</p> <p>“ And the court doth further find that all the property of the said defendant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railway Company, has been sold and delivered to the purchaser thereof, and that there is no further deed for a receiver herein.</p> <p>“ The court does further find that said receiver and his counsel, Doyle & Lewis, have performed valuable services in the care and preservation of the property of said defendant since the last allowance made them herein. It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that out of the funds in his hands said receiver be allowed, and he is hereby authorized to pay unto himself, in full of his compensation for such services, the sum of $200; to Doyle & Lewis, his said’ counsel, the sum of $300, in full payment for the services rendered him as such receiver, and to the clerk of this court the balance remaining in his hands, to wit, the sum of $269.18, to be applied by said clerk in part payment of the costs herein incurred.</p> <p>“ It is further ordered and adjudged by the court that upon making said payment of said sum to said clerk, and upon filing with the clerk of this court proper receipts, evidencing the disbursements by him made, as set forth in his said final account, said receiver shall stand discharged from all further duties and obligations as such receiver, and that the condition of said bond by him heretofore filed herein as such receiver be satisfied and said receiver and his surety be relieved from all liability thereon.</p> <p>“ And thereupon this cause was further heard upon the petition ox Arbuckle, Ryan & Company, one of the intervenors herein, for an order of the court distributing the proceeds arising from the sales of the property of the Put-in-Bay Water works, Light and Railway Company, heretofore made in accordance with the former order of this court, and was argued by counsel.</p> <p>“ In consideration whereof the court, being duly advised in the premises, doth find that the prayer of said petition should be granted.</p> <p>“ It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the clerk of this court be, and he hereby is, ordered and directed to forthwith distribute the moneys in the registry of the court and arising from said sales aforesaid in the following manner, to wit:</p> <p>“ I. To tbe clerk of this court the costs of this suit and remaining unpaid, including the sum of $175 to the special master commissioner hereby allowed as his compensation for his services by him rendered in selling said property, and the further sum of $54.30, hereby allowed him for the expenses and expenditures by him incurred in connection therewith, which said amounts shall be paid said master commissioner.</p> <p>“ II. To the owner or owners of receiver’s certificates, heretofore issued herein, upon the surrender and.cancellation thereof, the amount heretofore found to be due thereon, to wit, $7966.10, together with interest thereon, at the rate of 7$ per annum, from the 13th day of December, 1899, to the date when this order shall finally take effect.</p> <p>“III. To the.county treasurer of the county of Ottawa and State of Ohio the sum of $591.66, being the taxes and assessments levied and assessed against the property of said the Putin-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bail way' Company for the year 1899.</p> <p>IY. The one hundred one hundred sixty-fifth part of the balance remaining to Arbuckle, Byan & Company, the Bode-field Belting Company and Barbour & Starr, pro rata, in proportion to the amounts heretofore found due them respectively.</p> <p>“ The balance, after the payments aforesaid, to wit, the sum of $-, shall be retained in the registry of the court to await its further and final order.</p> <p>“ And thereupon this cause was .further heard, upon the motion of the Atlantic Trust Company, trustee, for leave to withdraw its petition filed herein for allowance of compensation; which leave is given, and the same is accordingly done, without prejudice, however, to the rights of said trustee to hereafter file its petition therefor.</p> <p>M To all the foregoing order and decree the said the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bailway Company, by its counsel, excepts on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction in the premises, for the reason that it appears by the record herein that this suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said court, and the parties to' said suit were improperly and collusively joined for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by said Circuit Court under the act of Congress of March 3,1875, as to which question of jurisdiction an appeal has been taken by the said the Put-in-JBay Waterworks, Light and Baihvay Company to the Supreme Court of the United States, at Washington.”</p> <p>On June 2, 1900, an appeal was allowed in the following terms:</p> <p>“ The former appeal prayed by the above-named appellant, the Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Bailway Company, and allowed by me on the 23d day of February, 1900, having been discontinued, and the said appellant having now presented a new petition praying for the allowance of an appeal from the decrees of this court made on the 12th, 13th and 15th days of December, 1899, said petition is now granted and the appeal is allowed.</p> <p>“And thereupon, on the request of Walter L. Granger, of counsel for the appellant, I do hereby certify to the Supreme Court of the United States that upon the hearing of the said cause, wherein the said decrees so appealed from were entered, as well as upon various interlocutory hearings during the progress of the cause, the said appellant denied the jurisdiction of the court over said cause and contended that the court was without jurisdiction upon the grounds that the amount in controversy was in truth and in fact much less than the sum of two thousand dollars ($2000), exclusive of interest and costs, and that the case had been fraudulently and collusively instituted by the parties thereto for the purpose of creating the appearance of jurisdiction not in fact existing; which contention, so far as related to the receiver’s certificates and the intervening petitions, was overruled.</p> <p>“ And it is accordingly certified that the appeal herein allowed is granted for the single purpose of presenting to the said Supreme Court the question whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to entertain the said cause and render the decrees so appealed from.</p> <p>“The clerk is therefore directed to certify to the United States Supreme Court, at Washington, the portions of the record in said cause appertaining to said jurisdictional question upon the appellant executing a bond for costs in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500).</p> <p>“ EL F. SeveeeNS, Circuit Judge.”</p>

' On September 11,1896, the American Oak Leather Company, a corporation of the State of Ohio, filed, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois a bill of complaint against C. H. Fargo & Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois; the United States Rubber Company, a corporation of the State of New Jersey; L. Candee & Company, a corporation of the State of Connecticut; John W. Arnold, United States Marshal for the Northern District of…

<p>EEEOE TO THE COUET OF APPEALS OK THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>This was an action of covenant brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by the Camden Iron Works, a corporation created under the laws of the State of New Jersey, against the District of Columbia, to recover the price of .certain iron pipe manufactured for and delivered to defendant by plaintiff in pursuance of a contract under seal. Several pleas were interposed, and among them the plea of non est fac-tum, and the plea of the statute of limitations of three years. To the latter plea a demurrer was sustained, and issue was joined on the others. The case went to trial and resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff below for $11,1)44.16, with interest from February 27, 1888. A motion for a new trial having been overruled, judgment was entered on the verdict, whereupon defendant carried the case to the Court of Appeals of the District, where the judgment below was affirmed. 15 App. D. C. 98. This writ of error was then sued out.</p> <p>The contract bore date June 29, 1887, and, by its terms, purported to be made by the District of Columbia of the first part, and the Camden Iron Works by Walter Wood, president, of the second part. It concluded as follows:</p> <p>“In witness whereof, the undersigned, William B. Webb, Samuel E. Wheatley, and William Ludlow, Commissioners of the District of Columbia, appointed under the act of Congress entitled cAn act providing a permanent form of government for the District of Columbia,’ approved June 11, 1878, and the party of the second part to these presents have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written.</p> <p>(Signed) “Williah B. Webb, [L. S.]</p> <p>(Signed) “ S. E. Wheatley, [L. S.]</p> <p>(Signed) “William Ludlow, [L. S.]</p> <p>“ Commissioners of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>“(Corporate seal Camden Iron Works.)</p> <p>(Signed) “Walter Wood, Dres’t Camden IronWorlisP</p> <p>The contract was proved and offered in evidence, but .its admission was objected to by defendant on the ground that it was not under the corporate seal of the District of Columbia. The objection was overruled, and defendant excepted. The evidence showed that no action was taken by the temporary board of Commissioners appointed under the act of Congress approved June 20,1874, looking to the adoption of a corporate seal for the District, and none by.the permanent board appointed under the act of Congress of June 11,1878, until September 23, 1887, when the board passed an order that the seal of the District of Columbia, as adopted by an act of the legislative assembly of August 3, 1871, be placed in the official charge and custody of the secretary of the board ; and it further appeared that this seal was not generally used until after the contract had been entered into, but was affixed to deeds conveying real estate, to bonds and securities, and, in some cases, to tax deeds. Plaintiff further proved that the contract was not in fact executed and delivered by the Commissioners before August 4, 1887. The evidence to this effect was objected to by defendant, the objection overruled and exception taken.</p> <p>The opinion of the Court .of Appeals further states the facts as follows:</p> <p>“ The contract provided for the manufacture of certain designated sizes of iron pipe by the plaintiff, and its complete delivery to the defendant, ‘ within 136 days after the date of the execution of the contract; one half of each size to- be delivered on or before September 25, 1887, and the remainder on or before November 10, 1887.’ For failure to deliver the pipes within the time thus fixed, the contract provided that there should ‘ be deducted from the contract price, as in said contract specified, one per cent of the contract price for all delinquent articles for each and every week day that they remained delinquent.’ There was a further provision that for failure to complete the work at the time specified, there should be deducted from the money to become due under the contract ‘ the sum of ten dollars per diem for the same period estimated as liquidated and fixed damages to the District.’</p> <p>“ In the contract there was a provision made for inspecting the iron , pipes and ‘ to determine whether there was any reason for rejection, prior to delivery.’ Payments were to be made after'August 1, 1887, for all pipe ‘received and accepted in proper order and condition, less twenty per cent of the amount found due, to be reserved until the satisfactory completion of the contract.’</p> <p>“There appears do have been a suspension in the execution of the contract, owing to misunderstandings as to the qualities of the work, and the inspection thereof; and consequently, but a small proportion of the pipe was delivered prior to November 30, 1887. But after that date, pipe worth $11,404.09, at contract rates, according to estimate made, was delivered to and accepted by the District of Columbia, and used by the corporation. The total value, at contract rates, of all the pipe delivered to and accepted by the District of Columbia was $16,335.87, on which there was paid in cash $5291.71, by two checks, which did not indicate that they were meant to be in full settlement of all moneys due under the "contract; and the balance, $11,044.16, was more than counterbalanced by the fines and penalties charged up by the defendant for non-delivery of the pipe within the time specified in the contract. It was for this balance of $11,044.16 with interest thereon from the 27th of February, 1888, that this action was brought. There is no pretence that there was any demand made by the defendant for any more or other quantity of pipe than that delivered under the contract and which was refused to be delivered by the plaintiff. On the -contrary, on November 30, 1887, when Captain Symons, the Assistant Engineer Commissioner of the District, requested that no more pipe should be east for delivery under the contract, there remained to be cast about 340,000 pounds, on which the profits to the plaintiff, at contract prices, would have been about $1300. After the plaintiff’s letter of November 30, 1887, assenting to the cancellation of the contract, as to all pipe not then manufactured, provided all pipe then manufactured should be taken and paid for at contract rates, without deductions, and Captain Symons’ reply thereto, directing the sending on of the pipe then cast and accepted by Hoyt, the value of the pipe, at contract rates, actually shipped to the defendant, was $11,404.16 It was for this amount that the verdict was rendered, with interest, and without any allowance or deductions for forfeitures or penalties for non-delivery of pipe within the time prescribed by the terms of the contract.”</p> <p>Certain instructions to the jury were requested and given by the court on plaintiff’s behalf. Instructions were also asked on behalf of defendant, and refused. To the rulings of the court in granting the instructions given for plaintiff, and in refusing the instructions asked for defendant, defendant duly excepted. The court also charged the jury generally, to which charge or any part thereof no exceptions were taken.</p> <p>The errors assigned were to the effect that an action of covenant would not lie on the contract because it was not under the seal of the District of Columbia; that it was not competent for plaintiff below to show by parol evidence that the contract was finally executed and delivered by defendant at a date subsequent to that mentioned in the contract itself, from which latter date the time allowed for the manufacture and delivery of the pipe should be computed; that the manufacture and delivery of the pipe within the time mentioned, constituted a condition precedent, and that no recovery could be had on the contract for any pipe delivered to and accepted by defendant after the time specified for delivery; that if plaintiff was entitled to recover for pipe delivered after the times mentioned, defendant was entitled to offset the penalties against the contract price as liquidated damages; and that no interest ought to have been allowed in the recovery.</p>

Held: in the case of The China, 7 Wall. 53 , that a vessel was liable for a collision occasioned by the fault of a■ compulsory pilot— a marked distinction from the English rule, which, by statute, exempts the vessel from such consequences. Indeed, the liability of the vessel for the negligence of the charterers is now fixed by statute in this country.

Held: That this was a non-Federal ground broad enough to support the judgment, and the writ of error must be dismissed.

Held: That the United States were bound to respect the rights of private property in the ceded territory, but that it had the right, to require reasonable means for determining the validity of alt titles within the ceded territory, to require all persons having claims to lands to present them for recognition, and to decree that all claims which are not thus presented, shall be considered abandoned: (2) That so far as the…

Held: under those circumstances, that no further tender was necessary, quoting the general rule laid down in Hills v. Exchange Bank, 105 U. S. 319 , as follows (p. 202): “ It is a general rule that when the tender of performance of an act is necessary to- the establishment of any right against another party, this tender or offer to perform is rvaived or becomes unnecessary when .it is reasonably certain that the offer…

Held: in opposition to the views expressed by his predecessor in the earlier case, that the lands were not reserved by virtue of the statutory reservation under the act of 1«54, because that section was repealed by the fifteenth section of the act of 1891 without any qualification, and the repeal went to the entire section; but he held that, “ Whatever may have been the purpose of Congress in making said reservation, it…

The plaintiffs in error commenced this proceeding in the superior court of the látate of Georgia, Chatham County, against the mayor, etc., of the city of Savannah and its city marshal, to enjoin the collection of taxes upon certain real estate in that city, of which they claim to be lessees from the city, and they allege that the taxes assessed upon such real estate are illegal ; they also seek to recover from the city the amount of taxes theretofore paid by them on such…

This action was brought to enforce certain mechanic’s liens provided for by section 4796, Revised Code of North Dakota, upon real estate described in the complaint. The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of the lienors, which on appeal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and the Red River Talley National Bank of Fargo, one of the defendants below, has brought the case here by writ of error.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: as the Supreme Court of Arizona held in the case at bar, that by a conveyance of the husband to the wife the property did not lose its homestead character. As the title certainly passed, that is unimportant; and equally unimportant whether the homestead was or was *573 not divested by the act of 1887, in the view we take of the effect of appellant’s judgment against Hancock.

<p>Alimony, whether in arrear at the time of an adjudication in bankruptcy, or accruing afterwards, is not provable in bankruptcy, or barred by the discharge.</p>

Held: That as the Supreme Court of Mississippi had decided that all the taxes had accrued after the consolidation of October 24, and the company had thereby lost its exemption; and as this was a construction of the general tax laws of the State, which were complex and difficult of interpretation, this court would accept that construction and deny the petition for a rehearing.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>This was a petition for a drawback upon hops and barley to the amount of $2371.35, and upon bottles and corks to the amount of $9817.97, used in the manufacture of bottled beer for export.</p> <p>' The Court of Claims made a finding of facts, the substance of which is set forth in the margin, and gave judgment for the first item, but rejected the second, and the claimant appealed.1-</p>

Held: four of the justices dissenting, that, as to this case, the new law was an ex post facto law, and that he could not again be tried for murder, in the first degree.

This is an appeal from a decree of tbe Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which affirmed a decree of the Supreme Court of~the District dismissing a bill in equity, which had been fileeLin that court.

<p>These cases, argued and submitted together, involve the appraisement of sugars imported from Brazil. The sugars were shipped “ green,” that is, contained moisture, a certain portion of which drained on the voyage, whereby they became more valuable. Duties were levied and collected by the collector upon the increased valuation, against the protest of the importers. Held that the appraisement so made was legal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Pifth' Circuit.</p>

<p>Second Circuit.</p>