East Tennessee Virginia Georgia Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission’s Empirical Analysis
181 U.S. 1 · 1901
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 6 district · 18 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 122 later decisions (20 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 1966 · most notably Houston East West Texas Railway Company v. United States (1914), Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907)
15 federal appellate · 6 district · 18 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
reviewedEast Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals)
Relationships
Relies on Texas Ry Co v. Interstate Commerce Commission · Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Railway Co. · Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Behlmer · Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry Co
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 122 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“‘-‘The only principle by which it, is possible to enforce the whole statute is the construction adopted by the previous opinions of this court; that is, that competition which is real and substantial and exercises a potential influence on rates to a particular point brings into play the dissimilarity of circumstance and condition provided by the statute and justifies the lesser charge to the , more distant and competitive point than to the nearer and noncompetitive place, and that this right is not destroyed by the mere fact that incidentally the lesser charge to the competitive point may seemingly give a preference to that point, and the greater rate to the noncompetitive point may apparently engender a discrimination against it. We say seemingly on the one hand and apparently on the other, because in the supposed cases the preference is not ‘undue’ or the discrimination ‘unjust.’ This is clearly so, when it is considered that the lesser charge upon which both the assumption of preference and discrimination is predicated is sanctioned by the statute, which causes the competition to give rise to the right to make the lesser charge. Indeed, the findings of fact made by the Commission in this case leave no room for the contention that either undue preference in favor of Nashville or unjust discrimination against Chattanooga arose merely from the act of the carriers in meeting the competition existing at Nashville.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"Tlie prohibition oí the third section, when that section is considered in its proper relation, is directed against unjust discrimination or undue preference arising from the voluntary and wrongful act of the carriers complained of as having given undue preference, and does not relate to acts the result of conditions wholly beyond the control of such carriers.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““To state these issues is at once to demonstrate that their decision, as a matter of first impression, properly belonged to the commission, since upon that body the law has specially Imposed the duty of considering them. Whilst the court has, in the discharge of its duty, been at times constrained to correct erroneous constructions which have been put by the commission upon the statute, it has steadily refused, because of the fact just stated, to-assume to exert its original judgment on the facts, where, under the statute, it was entitled, before approaching the facts, to the aid which must necessarily be afforded by the previous enlightened judgment of the commission upon such subjects. This rule is aptly illustrated by the opinion in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Behlmer (1900) 175 U. S. 648 [ 20 Sup. Ct. 209 , 44 L. Ed. 309 ], in which ease, after pointing out the same error of construction adopted and applied by the commission in the present case, the court declined to undertake an original investigation of the facts, saying (page 875 [175 U. S., page 219, 20 Sup. Ct., 44 L. Ed. 309]): ‘If, then, we were to undertake the duty of weighing the evidence in this record, we would be called upon, as a matter of original action, to investigate all these serious considerations which were shut out from view by the commission, and were not weighed by the Circuit Court of Appeals because both the commission and the court erroneously construed the statute. But the law attrib”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.