¶1Mr. William A. Powell, Washington, D. C. , for appellant.
¶2Mr. Charles Sumner Brown, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
¶3Before PROCTOR, BAZELON and FAHY, Circuit Judges.
¶5The question here is whether an order of the District Court dismissing a prior action is res judicata of the present action.
¶6In the earlier case, Sarah L. Slack, appellant (hereafter referred to as plaintiff), sued Charles W. Rich for personal injuries. Before trial Rich died. Plaintiff substituted Lovey V. Rich, administratrix. She moved to dismiss upon the ground that the right of action abated with the death of Charles W. Rich. 12 D.C.Code (1940) § 101.1 The plaintiff, adpiitting Rich’s death in August 1947, contended that the Act of June 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 487, ch. 508, § 1,2 amending the abatement statute cited above, was retroactive and revived the right of action against Rich’s legal representative. The court rejected this contention and entered an order dismissing the action. No appeal was taken.
¶7However, on April 5, 1948, Sarah L. Slack again filed suit against Lovey V. Rich, administratrix, upon the same cause of action. The defendant, appellee here, moved to dismiss upon the ground that the order for dismissal in the former action was res judicata. The motion was granted and the action dismissed. This appeal follows.
¶8We' have no doubt that the ordér for dismissal in the first suit operated “as an adjudication upon the merits” of the right of action, and is a bar to the present suit. Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.; American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. United States, 1944, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 62, 142 F.2d 571.
¶9As there is no need to do so we express no opinion concerning the effect of the Act of June 19, 1948.
¶10Affirmed.