182 Ill. 2d 247 - People v. Dekens’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act. Thus, there is no reason why the principle underlying the doctrine of proximate cause should not apply to criminal cases. Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions." Lowery, 178 Ill.2d at 467 , 227 Ill.Dec. 491 , 687 N.E.2d 973 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 222 Ill. 2d 392 - People v. Hudson · 33 So. 3d 625 - Witherspoon v. State

2. ““In explaining the intended scope of the doctrine in Illinois, the committee comments to section 9 — 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 state: Tt is immaterial whether the killing in such a case is intentional or accidental, or is committed by a confederate without the connivance of the defendant *** or even by a third person trying to prevent the commission of the felony.’ 720 ILCS Ann. 5/9 — 1, Committee Comments — 1961, at 12-13 (Smith-Hurd 1993). We believe that denying liability when the decedent is a cofelon would conflict with the legislature’s adoption of the proximate cause theory.” Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d at 254 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 222 Ill. 2d 392 - People v. Hudson · 342 Ill. App. 3d 849 - People v. Martinez

3. ““When a defendant’s commission of a forcible felony proximately results in the death of an innocent party, I agree that charging the defendant with murder may comport with notions of justice and fairness. There is, however, simply a qualitative difference between that situation and the situation presented here, where the death which resulted was that of a coparticipant in the underlying felony. As one renowned treatise on criminal law has noted: ‘[I]t is now generally accepted that there is no felony murder liability when one of the felons is shot and killed by the victim, a police officer, or a bystander ***. A more plausible explanation [for this conclusion] is the feeling that it is not justice (though it may be poetic justice) to hold the felon liable for murder on account of the death, which the felon did not intend, of a co-felon willingly participating in the risky venture. It is true that it is no defense to intentional homicide crimes that the victim voluntarily placed himself in danger of death at the hands of the defendant ***. But with unintended killings it would seem proper to take the victim’s willing participation into account ***.’ W. LaFave & A. Scott, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 7.5, at 217-18 (1986). The majority provides no explanation for how the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is served by applying it in cases such as this. Rather, the majority’s holding is simply that the proximate cause theory ‘compels’ this result. *** I disagree with this con”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 221 Ill. 2d 538 - People v. Klebanowski