Hickert v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 4 district · 61 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . A wanton act is something more than ordinary negligence, and yet it is something less than willful injury; to constitute wantonness, the act must indicate a realization of the imminence of danger and a reckless disregard and complete indifference and unconcern for the probable consequences of the wrongful act. It is sufficient if it indicates a reckless disregard for the rights of others with a total indifference to the consequences, although a catastrophe might be the natural result. A few of our most recent cases supporting tlie mentioned rules of law are MacDougall v. Walthall, 174 Kan. 663 , 257 P. 2d 1107 ; Elliott v. McKenzie, 180 Kan. 344 , 304 P. 2d 550 ; Hickert v. Wright, 182 Kan. 100, 104, 105 , 319 P. 2d 152 ; Dirks v. Gates, 182 Kan. 581, 589 , 322 P. 2d 750 ; Hanson v. Swain, 172 Kan. 105, 109 , 238 P. 2d 517 , and the many cases cited and reviewed in the mentioned authorities.” (P-701.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Muhn Ex Rel. Muhn v. Schell · Perry v. Schmitt

2. ““The proximate or legal cause of an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act. “Natural and probable consequences are those which human foresight can anticipate because they happen so frequently they may be expected to recur. “While it is not a necessary element of negligence that one charged with negligence should have been able to anticipate the precise injury sustained, a person is not charged with all possible consequences of his negligent acts. He is not responsible for a consequence which is merely possible according to occasional experience, but only for those consequences which are probable according to ordinary and usual experience. (Syl. ¶¶2, 3 and 4.)” (p. 108.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stevenson v. City of Kansas City

3. ““. . . The trouble from their standpoint is that a motion to make a petition more definite and certain does not he when the pleading attacked is sufficiently definite and certain to make the nature of the charge apparent and that a petition which fairly apprises the defendant of what the plaintiff’s claim is to be is not subject to a motion to make more definite and certain. When that is the situation, where such a motion is properly resisted, and overruled, the decisions on which appellants rely have no application and the attacked pleading is subject to liberal construction notwithstanding. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gibbs v. Mikesell