State v. Crosby’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

56 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Defendant’s contention that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt because such evidence might also be deemed compatible with innocence cannot be sustained. When considering -on appeal the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction of crime, the question before this court is not whether the evidence is incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis except guilt. That question was for the jury and trial court, and the function of this court is limited to ascertaining whether there was a basis in the evidence for a reasonable inference of guilt. [Citing cases.]” (p. 685.)”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Gregory · State v. Emler

2. ““[G.S. 1949] 67-301 [now K.S.A. 58-2301] provides that in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, the mortgagor of real property may retain the possession thereof. It has been held many times that a mortgage on real property is a lien thereon; that it is merely an incumbrance of security for a debt; that title to the property remains in the mortgagor; that in the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property legal title to the property does not pass until the sheriff s deed is executed and delivered, and that a mortgage does not convey any interest in the land itself. (Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tittel, 153 Kan. 530 , Syl. 2, 111 P.2d 1116 [opinion on motion for rehearing, 153 Kan. 747 , 114 P.2d 312 ], and Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. Hauser, 176 Kan. 9, 15 , 269 P.2d 453 .) “Conceding, for the sake of argument, that in one sense of the word a mortgagee has an ‘interest’ in the mortgaged property (the Bodwell case, supra), we are not here concerned with civil rights and liabilities growing out of the relationship, such as for acts of waste committed by the mortgagor, and the like. Our question is whether mortgaged real property is ‘the property of another person’ (the mortgagee) within the meaning of the statute, 21-581. “We think the answer is to be found in the principles and rules applicable to criminal prosecutions generally, a primary one being that criminal statutes are to be given a strict construction. . . . [A] rule of strict construction is to be applied to crim”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Houck

3. ““Conceding, for the sake of argument, that in one sense of the word a mortgagee has an ‘interest’ in the mortgaged property (the Bodwell case, supra [Bodwell v. Heaton, 40 Kan. 36, 38, 39 , 18 Pac. 901 ]), we are not here concerned with civil rights and liabilities growing out of the relationship, such as for acts of waste committed by the mortgagor, and the like. Our question is whether mortgaged real property is ‘the property of another person’ (the mortgagee) within the meaning of the statute, 21-581. “We think the answer is to be found in the principles and rules applicable to criminal prosecutions generally, a primary one being that criminal statutes are to be given a strict construction. . . .” (p. 683.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Parrish