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182 Mass. 256

Slade v. Talbot

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided November 24, 1902

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1902-11-24

<p> Devise and Legacy. </p> <p>A legacy of a certain number of shares of a certain stock is a general legacy and not specific, unless otherwise shown to be so, especially when the number of shares owned by the testator is less than the number named, and in this case the executor must purchase the shares necessary to make up the number bequeathed.</p>

Relies on Metcalf v. First Parish in Framingham · Johnson v. Goss · Trustees of Unitarian Society v. Tufts

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1902-11-24

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently May 1977

1 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

3019021910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Loring, J.

¶1This is a case where a testator, having at the time he made his will thirty-one shares, and at the time of his death twenty-five shares in the capital stock of a mill, made bequests of thirty-six shares of that stock. The residuary legatee contends that the legacies were specific, and that the residue should not be diminished by the executor buying the eleven shares necessary to make up the number of shares given by the testator. The thirty-six shares were made up of legacies to ten different persons. The first legacy was in the following terms : “To James Talbot of Dighton, five shares of the Laurel Lake Mills of Fall River; ” and the other nine legacies were given in *259similar words. The gift of the residue was “ all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed,” etc.

¶2It was held in Johnson v. Gross, 128 Mass. 433, and in Harvard Unitarian Society v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, that the legacies there in question were specific, although the testator did not use the word “ my ” or an equivalent phrase in connection with the personal property given to the legatees. But there is nothing in the several legacies in question to indicate that the gift is a specific one; it is a legacy of so many shares of stock; that per se is a general legacy; Bothamley v. Sherson, L. R. 20 Eq. 304, 308; Partridge v. Partridge, Cas. temp. Talbot, 226; Purse v. Snaplin, 1 Atk. 414; Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. Wms. 539, certainly where the number of shares given does not coincide with the number owned; White v. Winchester, 6 Pick. 48; Metcalf v. Framingham Parish, 128 Mass. 370, 373; Johnson v. Gross, 128 Mass. 433, 436. The residuary clause in the case at bar is just what the clause was not which was in question in Harvard Unitarian Society v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, relied on by the residuary legatee; in that case the residuary clause was “ the balance of my stock as per my stock-book, my furniture, and all other property not otherwise disposed of by me, I would have sold and the proceeds” distributed. Here the residue is “ the rest, residue and remainder of my estate ” ; that is to say, what is left of my estate after the foregoing provisions of my will have been complied with.

¶3A decree should be entered directing the executors to purchase eleven additional shares of the capital stock of the Laurel Lake Mills, and transfer to the several legatees the shares given them respectively.

¶4 So ordered.

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