182 So. 3d 251 - State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Important to the consideration of the excessiveness of the simple rape sentence is the fact that the district court ordered the sentences in this case to run concurrently. Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 883, [ 4 ] it is presumed that consecutive sentences are ordinarily appropriate for crimes, as in the instant case, that do not form part of the same transaction or series of transactions. Apparently because defendant was a first-time felony offender, the district court, after considering the sentences imposed for the forcible rape conviction and the simple rape conviction, believed that the imposition of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences was proper. The crime of simple rape presupposes that the defendant has taken advantage of the victim's abnormal state of mind induced by intoxication or any other cause. See La.R.S. 14:43(A). That a defendant may have taken advantage of an unconscious or sleeping victim alone does not place him among the most blameworthy of offenders committing the crime of simple rape. Nevertheless, the evidence related to the similar sexual assaults in this case shows that this defendant had engaged in a pattern of preying on young, incapacitated women, a factor the district court was free to consider in rendering the sentences in this case. Considering defendant's 2006 rape of J.H. in the context of his behavior over an extended period of time, rather than in isolation, we are unable to find that the district court manifestly abused its broad sentencing”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wagnon

2. “A prosecutor should refrain ' from making personal attacks on defense counsel and strategy. State v. Celestine, 12-1541, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/18/13), 131 So.3d 947, 954 , writ denied, 14-0158 (La.8/25/14), 147 So.3d 699 . Closing argument shall not appeal to prejudice. State v. Simms, 13-0676, p. 18 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/18/14), 143 So.3d 1258, 1269 , writ denied, 14-1542 (La.2/27/15), 160 So.3d 963 . However, prosecutors have wide latitude in their closing argument. State v. Haynes, 13-0323, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1083, 1090 . A trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments. State v. Webb, 13-0146, p. 26-27 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14) , 133 So.3d 258, 275-276 , writ denied, 14-0436 (La.10/3/14), 149 So.3d 793 , cert. denied sub nom., Webb v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1719 , 191 L.Ed.2d 689 (2015). Even where a prosecutor exceeds the bounds of proper argument, a reviewing court will not reverse a conviction unless thoroughly convinced that the argument influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. State v. Caliste, 12-0533, p. 17 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/4/13), 125 So.3d 8, 18 . Further, common sense and logic suggests that in this respect the reviewing court must be thoroughly convinced that the improper argument influenced the jury and contributed to it rendering a verdict based, at least in part, on prejudice or some reason other than the weight of the evidence presented. Credit should be accorded to the good sense and fa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 195 So. 3d 1210 - State v. Ross

3. “appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wagnon