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← 183 F.3d 173 - Charles Harris

Charles Harris’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

129
cited by 129 later decisions
19
states following
August 2023
most recently cited

19 district · 37 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 129 later decisions — most recently August 2023 · most notably In Re Firstmerit Bank, N.A. (2001), In Re Halliburton Co. (2002)

19 district · 37 state decisions — followed in 19 states

6901999200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. · First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan · Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. · Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. · Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 129 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[i]n evaluating claims of unconscionability, courts generally recognize two categories, procedural, or “unfair surprise,” unconscionability and substantive uncon-scionability. See Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 408 Pa.Super. 332 , 596 A.2d 883, 885 (1991); Bishop, 480 A.2d at 1095 ; Germantown, 491 A.2d at 145-46 . Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process by which an agreement is reached and the form of an agreement, including the use therein of fine print and convoluted or unclear language. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990). This type of unconscionability involves, for example, “material, risk-shifting” contractual terms which “are not typically expected by the party who is being asked to ‘assent’ to them” and “often appear[] in the boilerplate of a printed form.” Germantown, 491 A.2d at 145-46 . Substantive unconscionability refers to contrae- tual terms that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent. See id., at 145-147 ; Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa.Super. 164 , 608 A.2d 1061, 1068 (1992). Thus, “[u]ncon-scionability requires a two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding acceptance of the provisions.” Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brady, 97”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process by which an agreement is reached and the form of an agreement, including the use therein of fine print and convoluted or unclear language.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.