Vanessa Abraham v. Kimber’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

48 district · 12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 153 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Combining the standards announced in Gamer and Graham, our inquiry for the use, of deadly force is as follows: Giving due regard to the pressures faced by the police, was it objectively reasonable for the officer to believe, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that deadly force was necessary to prevent the suspect’s escape, and that the suspect posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others? In determining the reasonableness of all degrees of force, the Supreme Court has said that the factors to consider include the “severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. Because we are applying this standard on a summary judgment motion, we must address to what extent questions of “reasonableness” can be resolved on summary judgment. Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment resembles tort law in its attention to how a specific, concrete circumstance should affect an officer’s judgment. This sensitivity to context suggests that regardless of whether objective reasonableness invokes a different and heightened standard from negligence, reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment should frequently remain a question for the jury. To put the matter more directly, since we lack a clearly defined rule for declaring when conduct is unr”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Adams v. City of Atl. City · Bennett v. Murphy

2. “a passing risk to a police officer is not an - 79 - In holding that the officers' testimony was entirely consistent as to Root's movements immediately prior to the shooting, my view is that the majority has taken an unduly narrow view of the evidence. Op. 35, 36-37. It is readily apparent that the officers' accounts contain many inconsistencies as to Root's movements directly before the shooting. While some officers stated that Root was seated or kneeling, others recalled Root standing on two feet, and one officer first testified that Root was standing but later said that Root was merely attempting to stand. There were also officers who testified that Root's hand was by his chest the entire time, while others said Root moved his hand up to his chest. Some of the officers observed Root reaching into his jacket, others testified that they fired because Root was removing his hand from his jacket, and yet another officer testified that ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bannon v. Godin · Zion v. Nassan

3. “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he actively is resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, as well as the possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time. [Ibid, (citations omitted).]”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. ESTATE OF · Ball v. Township of Silver Spring