¶1 At tbe close of tbe evidence bis Honor charged tbe jury as follows: “Gentlemen of tbe jury, you bave beard tbe evidence of tbe witnesses. If you believe tbe evidence, I instruct you tbat you will find tbe defendant Laura Singleton guilty.” To tbis instruction tbe defendant excepted, and tbe same is assigned as error. We think tbe exception is well taken, and under a uniform line of decisions it must be beld for reversible error. S. v. Alley, 180 N. C., 663; S. v. Boyd, 175 N. C., 793; Brooks v. Mill Co., 182 N. C., 260, and cases there cited.
¶2 Tbe defendant entered on tbe trial with tbe common-law presumption of innocence in ber favor. Her plea of not guilty east upon tbe State tbe burden of establishing ber guilt, not merely to tbe satisfaction of tbe jury, but beyond a reasonable doubt. Tbe evidence bere was not' compelling. Tbe jury might bave believed it and yet acquitted tbe defendant. Furthermore, it is error for tbe trial judge to direct a verdict in a criminal action, where there is no admission or presumption, calling for explanation or reply on tbe part of tbe defendant. S. v. Hill, 141 N. C., 769; S. v. Riley, 113 N. C., 651. See, also, S. v. Falkner, 182 N. C., 793.
¶3 We feel sure tbat tbe language employed was only an inadvertence on tbe part of tbe learned judge who tried tbe case; but again we are constrained to call attention to tbe fact tbat tbe form of expression, “If you believe tbe evidence,” should be eschewed in charging tbe juries in both criminal and civil actions. Merrell v. Dudley, 139 N. C., 58.
¶4 New trial.