Volume 183 — United States Reports

Held: constituted an illegal act, and even if the complainants had not retained their right to the use of the words “ Raht-jen’s Composition,” that the defendant had not acquired the right to use the name in such a way as to cause the public to believe that his product was the product of Rahtjen or of his delegates. The defendant was therefore condemned in judgment and enjoined from the use of the words in future.

Held: after full review of the previous oases, that the act in question was a valid exercise of the police power of the State, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah, sustaining the legislation, was affirmed.

This was an action tried in the circuit court of Rbea County, Tennessee, wherein T. A. Barton, a citizen of Tennessee, sought to recover from the Dayton Coal and Iron Company (Limited), a corporation organized under the laws of Great Britain, and doing business as manufacturer of pig iron and coke in said county. The company owns a store where it sells goods to its employés and other persons.

• This was an action brought by Fred A. McMaster, administrator of the estate of Frank E. McMaster, deceased, against the New York Life Insurance Company on five policies of insurance of one thousand dollars each, upon the life of Frank E. Mc-Master.- The applications were dated December 12, and the -policies December 18, 1893. The premiums for a year in advance were paid, and the policies delivered December 26, 1893.

Held: That it was not important to inquire whether there was any evidence tending to prove the existence of the alleged fire in the front cellar because the submission of the question to the jury was all that the plaintiff could ask, and the verdict negatives its existence. (2) That there was no evidence of any fire in the back cellar preceding the lighting of the match in the front cellar.

This case involves the question of removal from a state to a Federal court. The State of Missouri has a body of statutes for the regulation of railroads. By one section a board of railroad commissioners is created. To this board is committed the duty of supervising the conduct and charges of railroads, of hearing and deciding complaints against them, .and making such orders as the circumstances require. Section 1143,'Rev. Stat.

Held: that this appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and without any determination of the rights of the parties. The statement of facts will be found in the opinion' of the court. Mr. Robert A. Howard for appellant. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt was on his brief. Mr. George A. King and Mr. J. W. Douglass for appellee. Mr. William B. King filed a brief for same.

Held: That this court was bound by this construction of the constitution, and, therefore, that the railroad company could not claim an irrepealable exemption in its charter. Held, also, That the exemption being repealable, the question whether it had in fact been repealed was a local' and not a Federal question.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>In March, 1897, Charles U. Cotting, a citizen of the State of Massachusetts, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas a bill of complaint against the Kansas City Stock Yards Company, a corporation of the State of Kansas, and certain. officers of that company, and Louis C. Boyle, Attorney General of the State of Kansas. A few days later, Francis Lee Higginson, a citizen of the State of, Massachusetts, filed a bill of complaint in the same court and against the same parties.</p> <p>These suits were subsequently ordered by the court to be consolidated, and were thereafter proceeded in as one.</p> <p>The plaintiffs respectively alleged that they were stockholders of the Kansas City Stock Yards Company, and that the suits were brought in their own behalf and that of other stockholders having a like interest, who might thereafter join in the prosecution thereof. The main purpose of the suits was to have declared invalid a certain act of the legislature of the State of Kansas, approved March-3, 1897, entitled “An act defining what shall constitute public stock yards, defining the duties.of the person or persons operating the same, and. regulating all charges thereof, and removing restrictions in the trade of dead animals, and providing penalties for violations of this act.”</p> <p>A temporary restraining order was granted, and subsequently a motion for a preliminary injunction was made. Pending that motion the court appointed a special master, with power to take testimony and report the same with his findings, as to all matters and things in issue upon the hearing of the • preliminary injunction prayed for. 79 Fed. Rep. 679. On August 24,1897, the special master filed his report. On October 4, 1897, the motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on affidavits, the.master’s report, exceptions thereto on behalf 'of both parties, and arguments of counsel. The motion was refused, and the restraining order, which had remained in force in the meantime, was set aside. 82 Fed. Rep. 839.. r</p> <p>A stipulation was thereupon entered into that the defendants should forth with filé their answers to the bills; that replications thereto should be immediately filed, and that the cases, thus put at issue, should be heard on final hearing, upon the pleadings, proofs, master’s report and exhibits, without further testimony from either party.</p> <p>On October 28,1897,'after argument, the court dismissed the bills of complaint. 82 Fed. Rep. 850.- In the opinion of Circuit Judge Thayer 'there was the following order, which was also embodied in the final decree:</p> <p>“The great importance of the. questions involved in these cases will doubtless occasion an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, where they will be finally settled and determined. If, on such appeal, the Kansas statute complained of should be adjudged invalid for any reason, and in the meantime the statutory schedule of rates should be enforced, the stock yards company would - sustain a great and irreparable loss. Under such circumstances, as was said in substance by the Supreme Court in, Ilo'oey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 161, it is the right and duty of the trial court to maintain, if possible, the status quo pending an appeal, if the questions at issue are involved in doubt; and equity rule 93 was enacted in recognition of that right. The court is of opinion that the cases at bar are of sucb moment and the questions at issue so balanced with doubt, as to justify and require an exercise of the power in question. Therefore, although the bills will be dismissed, yet an order will at the same time be entered restoring and continuing in force the injunction which was heretofore granted for the term of ten days, and if in the meantime an appeal shall be taken, such injunction will be continued in force until the appeal is heard and determined in the Supreme Court of the United States: provided that, in addition to the ordinary appeal bond, the Kansas City Stock Yards Company shall make and file in this court its bond in the penal sum of $200,000, payable to the clerk of this court and his successors in office, for the benefit of whom it may concern, conditioned that in the event of the decree dismissing the bills is affirmed, it will, on demand, pay to the party or parties entitled thereto all overcharges for yard-ing and feeding live stock at its stock yards in Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, which it may have exacted in violation of sections 4 and 5 of the Kansas statute relative to stock yards, approved March 3, 1897, since an injunction was first awarded herein, to wit, on April —, 1897; and that it will in like manner pay such overcharges, if any, as it may continue to exact in violation of said statute during the pendency of the appeal; said obligation to become void if the statute in question shall be pronounced invalid by the Supreme Court.” 82 Fed. Kep. 857.</p> <p>On November 4,1897, an appeal was duly taken and allowed to this court.</p> <p>Subsequently, Louis C. Boyle’s term of office as -Attorney General having expired, his successor, A. A. Godard, was substituted as a party defendant.</p> <p>The act of the legislature of the State of Kansas is in the following terms:</p> <p>“ Seo. 1. Any stock yards within this State, into which live stock is received, for the purpose of exposing or having the same exposed for sale or feeding, and doing business for compensation, and which for the preceding twelve months shall have had an average daily receipt of not less than one hundred head of cattle, or three hundred head of hogs, or three hundred head of sheep, are hereby declared to be public stock yards.</p> <p>“ Sec. 2. Any person, company, or corporation owning or operating any public stock yard or stock yards in this State is hereby declared to be a public stock yards operator, whether living or being within this State or not.</p> <p>“ Sec. 3. Every such public stock yards operator or operators shall annually, on the 31st day of December of each year, file with the secretary of State, an itemized statement certified and sworn to, setting forth the number of head of cattle, calves, sheep, hogs, horses and mules received in his or their public stock yards during the year next preceding.</p> <p>“ Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful for the owners, proprietors, or the employes of the owners or proprietors of any such public stock yards within this State, to charge for driving, yarding, watering, and weighing of stock, greater prices than the following : For driving, yarding, watering and weighing of cattle, 15 cents per head; calves, 8 cents per head; hogs, 6 cents per head; sheep, 4 cents per head; and there shall be but one yardage charged.</p> <p>“ Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful for the owner, owners, or proprietors, of their employes, of any such stock yards within this State, to sell and deliver at the rate of less than two thousand pounds for a ton of hay, or any part thereof, the same to be of good quality, or to charge for or to sell the same at more than one hundred per cent above the average market price, or value of such hay upon the markets of the towns or cities wherein such stock yards are located, upon the day preceding such sale and delivery; and it shall also be unlawful for any such owners, or proprietors, or employes, to sell and deliver less than seventy pounds of corn in the ear for a bushel, or less than fifty-six pounds of shelled corn for a bushel or to charge for or to sell the same at more than one hundred per cent above the average market price or value of such ear corn or shelled corn on the markets of the towns or cities wherein said stock yards are located, on the day next preceding such sale and delivery. All feed not above named shall be sold for no greater per cent of profit than hereinbefore provided.</p> <p>“ Sec. 6. It stall be unlawful for the owners or proprietors of any stock yards to prohibit the owner or owners, or the rep-, resentatives of any owner or owners of any dead stock in such yard or yards from selling such dead stock to any person or persons.</p> <p>“ Sec. 7. That any person or persons violating any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined for the first offence not more than one hundred dollars; for the second offence not less than one hundred dollars nor more that two hundred dollars ; and for the third offence not less than two hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months for each offence; and for each subsequent offence he or they shall be fined in any sum not less than one thousand dollars and by imprisonment in the county jail not less than six months.</p> <p>“ Sec. 8. It is hereby made the duty of the attorney general to prosecute all violations of the provisions of this act.</p> <p>“ Sec. 9. All acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.</p> <p>“ Sec. 10. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its publication in .the official state paper.” Laws of Kansas, 1897, chap. 210, p. 418.</p>

Held: That no actual controversy now remains or can arise between the parties.

Held: except as the conditions may have been changed by the facts hereinbe-fore stated, but that neither the defendant nor the said Peterson ever took any part in the management of either of said banks or participated in the administration of their affairs.” The “facts hereinbefore stated” consisted not only of those which have been given above, but also of correspondence be- • tween the officers of defendant and the…

This was an action brought originally in the Circuit Court for Greene County, Missouri, by the Iiaselti'nes against the Central National Bank, to recover double the amount of certain alleged usurious interest paid by the plaintiffs to defendant, and which they sought to recover under the second clause of Rev. Stat. sec. 5198, providing that “in case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover…

This was an action instituted in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, by the Central National Bank to recover of the defendants the amount of a promissory note for $2240, executed June 15, 1896, by two of the defendants as principals and two others as sureties. The answer was a general denial and a special defence of usury in the original notes, and partial payments, as set up in the several paragraphs of the answer.

<p>The Federal Constitution neither grants nor forbids to the governor of a State the right to stay the execution of a sentence of death.</p> <p>The question whether, under a state statute a convicted party has a year in •which to file a motion for a new trial, and that therefore no sentence can be executed on him until that time, is a question to be determined by the courts of the State.</p> <p>The treaty of February 26, 1871, between the United States and Italy only requires equality of treatment, and that the same rights and privileges be accorded to a citizen of Italy that are given to a citizen of the United States under like circumstances, and there is nothing in the petition tending to show such lack of equality.</p> <p>Section 761 of the Revised Statutes provides as to habeas corpus cases that “the court or justice or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require ; ” and this mandate is applicable to this court, whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction.</p>

This was an action- to enforce a personal liability of stockholders. It was commenced in a justice’s court of Los Angeles city, Los Angeles County, California, on September 80,1898, by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error. It was-subsequently transferred to the superior court of the copnty, where a trial was had on- January 1Y, 1900, before the court without a jury.

This was an action begun in the Circuit Court as a Court of Claims by the firm of Dooley, Smith & Co., to recover duties exacted of them and paid under protest to the collector of the port of San Juan, Porto Eico, upon merchandise imported into that port from the port of New York after May 1, 1900, and since the Foraker act.

The statement of the ease wfEf be found in the opinion of the court. The case was argued December 17,18,19 and 20,1900. Ooeize, Appellant, v. United States was heard at the same time. Leave was granted in this case to Mr. Alexander Porter Morse to file a brief on behalf of interested parties.

<p>The test of the right to remove a case from a state court into the Circuit Court of the United States under section two of the act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, is that it must bé a case over which the Circuit Court might have exercised -original jurisdiction under section one of that act.</p> <p>A case cannot be removed on the ground that it is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States unless that appears by plaintiff’s statement of his own claim, and if it does not so appear,' the want of it cannot be supplied by any statement of‘ the petition for removal or in the subsequent pleadings, or by taking judicial notice of facts not relied on and regularly brought into controversy.</p> <p>Although it appears from plaintiff’s statement of his claim that it cannot be maintained at all because inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States, it does not follow that the case arises under that Constitution or those laws. ,</p>

Held: that something more than passive non-resistance in an insolvent debtor is necessary to invalidate a judgment and levy on his property, when the debt is due and he has no defenceand that in such case there is no legal obligation on the debtor to file a petition in "bankruptcy to prevent tbe judgment and levy, and a failure to do so is not sufficient evidence of an intent to give a pi’eference to the judgment…

Held: first, that there was a mechanics’ lienin favor of the Pipe Works; that whilst it was true that, subsequent to *223 its decision in the mechanics’ lien suit, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had decided that a mechanics’ lien could not arise, on the plant of the waterworks, under the circumstances disclosed, the Federal court was not bound by such interpretation of the state statute, and it adhered to its own previous…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF' OHIO.</p> <p>Tee case is stated in- the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>A fair interpretation of the language used by the District Judge in the court below in granting the application for a warrant of' removal from New York to Georgia shows that from the evidence he was of opinion that there existed probable cause, and that the defendants should therefore be removed for trial before the court in which the indictment was found.</p> <p>In proceedings touching the removal of a person indicted, in another State from that in which he is found to that in which the indictment is found this court must assume, in the absence of the evidence before the court below, that its finding of probable cause was sustained by competent evidence.</p> <p>It is nota condition precedent to taking action under Kev. Stat. § 1014that an indictment for the offence should have been found.</p> <p>The finding of an indictment does not preclude the Government, under Rev. Stat. § 1014, from giving evidence of á certain and definite character concerning the commission of the offence by the defendants in regard to acts, times, and circumstances which are stated in the indictment itself with less minuteness and detail.</p> <p>Upon this writ the point to be decided .is, whether the judge who made the order for the removal of'the defendants had jurisdiction to make it; and if-he had the question whether upon the merits he ought to have made it is not one which can be reviewed by means of a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>The indictment in this case is prima facie good; and when a copy of it is certified by the proper officer, a magistrate acting pursuant'to Rev. Stat. § 1014, is justified in treating the instrument as an indictment found by a competent grand jury, and is not authorized to go into evidence which may show or tend to show violations of the United States statutes in the drawing of the jurors composing the grand jury which found the indictment.</p> <p>By a removal such as was made in this case the constitutional rights of the defendants were in no way taken from them.</p>

Held: Following the courts below, that the loss must be presumed to have arisen from imperfect stowage: (2) That testing the exemptions in the ticket by the rule of public policy, they were void: (3-) That the arbitrary limitation of 250'francs to each passenger, unaccompanied by any right to increase the amount by an adequate and reason-able proportional payment, was void. *264 The libel by which this action was…

<p>ERROR TO THE SURROGATE’S COURT OF THE COUNTY-OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>David Dows, Senior, a citizen and resident of the city and State of New York, died March 30, 1890, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate by the Surrogate’s Court of New York County on April 14, 1890. The will provided that the. legal title to the property mentioned and described in the sixth clause thereof should vest in the executors’ names as trustees during the lifetime of testator’s son, David Dows, Jr.,' with-power to manage and control the sajme, and with the duty to pay the net income therefrom to said David. Dows, Jr. The will further provided that upon the death of David Dows, Jr., the property should vest absolutely and at once in such of his children him surviving, and the issue of his deceased children as he should by his last will and testament designate and appoint, and in such-manner and upon such terms as he might legally impose. In and by the eighth clause or paragraph of his said will, David Dows, Senior, devised and bequeathed the legal title to his residuary estate to his executors as trustees, to hold and manage the same, one eighth part in trust during the lifetime of testator’s widow, and one-eighth part in trust for each of testator’s seven children — one of whom .was the said David Dows, Jr. It was made the duty of the trustees to pay over the net income to the respective persons named during their respective lives, and it was provided that, upon the death of each of said persons, the said one eighth part of the residuary estate, with any accumulations and profits, should vest absolutely and at once in such of his or her children, or the issue of such children, as he or she might by his or her last will and testament designate and appoint, and in-such manner and upon such terms as he or she may legally impose. It was .provided, in both the sixth and eighth clauses, that if the legatee for life shall die intestate, then the property should vest absolutely and at once in his or her children surviving, share and shard alike.</p> <p>David Dows, Junior, died January 13, 1899, leaving a last will and testament, wjiich was duly admitted to probate by the Surrogate’s Court of Westchester County, New York, by the third paragraph or clause whereof, in the exercise of the power of appointment given him in his father’s will, he provided that the property mentioned and described in the said sixth and eighth clauses of the will of David Dows, Senior, should vest upon his death in his three children, David, Robert and Nemeth, in a manner therein described.</p> <p>On October 31, 1900, Bird S. Coler, Comptrolldr of the city of New York, and Theodore P. Gilman, Comptroller' of the State of N§w York, filed a petition in the Surrogate’s Court of New York County, in which, after reciting the foregoing facts, they alleged that the transfer of funds and property of which David Dows, Junior, had the life use and over which he had exercised the power of appointment given him in his father’s will, was taxable, and they therefore prayed for the appointment of a transfer tax appraiser, in order that the transfer tax might be duly assessed and imposed. Thereupon Charles K. Lexow was so appointed, and on January 31,1901, after having given notice to the said Comptrollers and to the executors and trustees of the last will of .David Dows, Senior, and to the executors of the last will of David Dows, Junior, and to the guardians of the minor children of David Dows, Junior, the appraiser tiled in the Surrogate’s office a report of his valuation of the interests of the three sons of David Dows, Junior, under the respective wills of their father and grandfather. Certain exceptions to this report were filed on behalf of the executors and guardians, thé nature of which will hereafter appear. Thereafter, on February 15, 1901, the Surrogate, on the basis of the report of the said appraiser, assessed a transfer tax of upwards of $7000 against each of the respective interests of the three sons of David Dows, Junior. The exceptions to the appraiser’s report and to the assessment were, on March 6, 1901, after argument by counsel, overruled, and the Surrogate entered the following order and judgment:</p> <p>“It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that said report and order so appealed from be and they aré hereby affirmed, and that the date when the transfers now taxed were affected was January 13, 1899, that date being fixed because it was the date of the death of David Dowrs, Junior, the donee of the power contained in the will of David Dows, Senior.”</p> <p>An appeal rvas taken from the order and decree of the Surrogate to the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York, and by that court, on March 22, 1901, the order of the Surrogate was affirmed. On appeal duly taken, the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, on May 17, 1901, affirmed the order and judgment of the appellate division of the Supreme Court, and the judgment of the said Court of Appeals and the record of the proceedings were remitted into thé Surrogate’s Court of New York, to be enforced according to law, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was on May 28, 1901, made the judgment and order of the Surrogate’s Court. And on June 13, 1901, a writ of error to that judgment was allowed, and the cause was brought to this court.</p>

<p>The deed of an Indian, who has received a patent of land providing that it should never be sold or conveyed by the patentee or his heirs without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, is void, and the statutes of limitation do not run against the Indian or his heirs so long as the condition of incompet.ency remains; but where it appeared that by treaty subsequent to the deed, all restrictions upon the sales of land by incompetent Indians or their heirs, were removed, it was held that from this time the statute of limitations began to run against the grantor and his heirs.</p> <p>Even if Indians while maintaining their tribal relations are not chargeable ■with laches, or failure to assert their claims -within the time prescribed by the statutes, they lose their immunity when their relations with their tribe are dissolved and they are declared to be citizens of the United States.</p> <p>A deed, valid upon its face, made by one having title to the land, and containing the usual covenants of warranty, when received by one purchasing the laud in good faith, with no actual notice of a defect in the title of the grantor, constitutes color of title; and in Kansas, possession without a paper title seems to be sufficient to enable the possessor to set up the statute of limitations.</p> <p>The fact that the Secretary of the Interior might thereafter declare the deed to be void, does not ipso facto prevent the statute from running.</p>

Held: against his objection, that he was at the time that the proceeding by the auditor began, an official resident of Marion County, and .was therefore within'the express terms of the statute. Held that this was a construction or application of the statute to the case in hand which was binding on this court.

, were as follows : “A person applied in St. Louis to an agent of a New York insurance company for insurance on his life. Held: that the policy was void.” The unanimous

Held: That the specified crime was not mentioned in the preceding, articles. That the offences of which the accused was convicted under the 60th article were distinct from the acts prohibited by section 5488.

This was a bill in equity brought by the Mechanics’ Savings Bank and Trust Company for the use of S. J. Pryor, assignee, against the Guarantee Company of North America, for an accounting and for a decree for the amount alleged to be due complainant on two bonds executed by tbe Guarantee Company to the bank; one insuring tbe latter corporation .against such pecuniary loss, as it might sustain by reason of the fraudulent acts of John Schardt, as teller and collector; and the…

Held: *425 (1) That although the cruiser was not a ship when Alexandroff arrived at Philadelphia, she became such upon being launched; (2) That, under the treaty with Russia of 1832, in virtue of which these proceedings were taken, she was a ship of war as distinguished from a merchant vessel, notwithstanding she had not received her equipment or armament, and was still unfinished; (3) That, under-her contract of…

The constitution of Florida of 1868, art. 16, sec. 24, as amended by art. 11 of the amendments of 1875, is as follows: “The property of all corporations, whether heretofore or hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation, unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes.” Sec. 26, chap. 3413, of the Laws of Florida, March 5,1883, reads: “If any assessor, when making his assessments, shall discover that any land in…

Held: that it was the duty of the commissioners. to enforce the. rate, and that an injunction would lie.

Held: on the appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States, that it was not competent for courts of equity to interfere with the action of the commission in respect to fixing rates before the rates were fixed at all, and when it could not appear whether the companies would have any reason to complain of them.

<p>CROSS APPEALS EBOM THE CIBOUIT COUBT OE APPEALS EOB THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

ON July 16, 1895, the United States Trust Company of New York filed its bill in the office of the clerk of the district court of the second judicial district of the Territory of New Mexico, praying foreclosure of a mortgage given by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company. On January 10, 1896, Charles W. Smith was appointed receiver. On April 10, 1896, a decree of foreclosure was entered.

This was a petition by the Wilder’s Steamship Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Ter ritory of Hawaii, for a writ of mandamus to the United States-Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to entertain an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of -Hawaii. On December 27, 1899, the steamer Claudine, one of the petitioner’s steamships, came into collision with the barkentine William Carson.

This was an indictment on the statute of Massachusetts of 1894, c. 522, § 98, for negotiating and transacting unlawful insurance with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business in Massachusetts.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OE BIBB COUNTY, STATE OE GEORGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in tbe opinion of the court.</p>

<p>There is no prejudicial error in the ruling of the court below on the admission of testimony.</p> <p>Assignments of error cannot be based upon instructions given or refused in an equity suit.</p> <p>The locations are valid so far as they depend upon the discovery of gold.</p> <p>The notices as set forth in the opinion of the court constituted a sufficient location.</p> <p>Grantees of public land take by purchase.</p> <p>In Manuel v. Wolff, 152 U. S. 505, it was decided that a location by an alien was voidable, not void, and was free from attack by any one exkept the Government.</p>

This is a bill in equity brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, praying for an injunction against respondents from issuing a patent to the town of Las Yegas, New Mexico, of the lands in the Las Yegas private land grant, -or, if a patent has issued, to declare it to be void, or if a patent has not issued, to direct one to issue “ to' all of said' lands, to the heirs, legal representatives and assigns of the said Juan de Dios Maese, Manuel Duran, Miguel…

<p>Section 3 of the Compiled Laws of Nebraska of 1889, c. 72, providing for the incorporation of railroad companies, is as follows: “ Every railroad company, as aforesaid, shall be liable for all damages inflicted upon the person of passengers while being transported over its road, except in cases where the injury done arises from the criminal negligence of the person injured, or when the injury complained of shall be the violation of some express rule or regulation of said road actually brought to his or her notice.” Held that the plaintiff in error, being a domestic corporation of Nebraska, accepted with its incorporation the liability so imposed by the laws of that State, and cannot now complain of it.</p>

<p>Chicago, Rc/pk Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Zernecke, ante, 682, affirmed and followed.</p>

<p>Patent No. 501,537, for an improved method of repairing asphalt pavements, which forms the' subject of controversy in this suit in this court, was anticipated in invention, hy apatent issued in Prance to Paul Crochet June 11, 1880.</p>

Held: for reasons stated in the opinion of this court in this case, that the opposing claimants had no valid claim to the lands ; that the improvements made upon the land when it was unsurveyed, not having been made under the personal supervision of Orillie Stram, she had not had the personal contact with the land required by law; that the power given to Eaton to locate the land, and the power given to sell it, as they…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OS' APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York by the plaintiffs, who are defendants in error here, and are residents of Liverpool, England, to recover the value of some two hundred bales of cotton destroyed by fire at Westwego, Louisiana, opposite the city of New Orleans, November 12, 1894, at a pier on the west bank of the Mississippi RiVer, owned by the plaintiff ip error. This is the same fire which is mentioned in Texas <& Pacific. Railway Company v. Clayton, 173 U. S. 348. Upon the first trial the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, but the judgment entered thereon was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 Fed. Rep. 533, and a new trial granted. Upon the second trial, the court, following the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, directed a verdict for the plaintiffs for the value of the cotton, and the judgment entered upon that verdict having been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the authority of its former opinion, 99 Fed. Rep. 1006, the railway company brings the case here by writ of error. The defence of the company is based upon a clause in the bill of lading which will be set out hereafter.</p> <p>' The cotton had been shipped at Temple, in the State of Texas, on the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway, to be carried over its road and the defendant’s road to New Orleans, and from that port to Bremen. It arrived at New Orleans at the pier of the railway company November 6, 1894. One hundred and sixty bales were unloaded on November 7, and the balance soon thereafter, but on what day is not certain. One hundred and twenty bales were unloaded and placed at. one point, and two different lots of forty bales each were deposited at other points, thus leaving the cotton at three different points on the pier of the railway companjr. At this time the pier was quite full, there being over twenty thousand bales deposited upon it and some eight thousand .bales in cars Availing to be unloaded. The pier Avas built, owned and in the exclusive possession of the railway company. The bill of lading Avhicb Avas issued at' Temple, in the State of Texas, by the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Raihvay, expressed on its face to be on behalf of that company and also the defendant company and the steamship company. It was an elaborate document, and purported to be “an export bill of lading approved by the permanent committee on uniform bill of lading.” It acknoAvledged the receipt of the cotton consigned as marked and to be carried to the port of NeAV Orleans, Louisiana, and thence by the Elder, Dempster & Company’s steamship line to the port of Bremen, Germany. It had conditions Avhich are stated to be:</p> <p>“ (1) With respect to the service until delivery at the port of New Orleans, Louisiana.”</p> <p>“ (2) With resjpect- to the service after delivery at the port of New Orleans, Louisiana.”</p> <p>There are tAvelve clauses relating to the service until delivery and fifteen clauses relating specifically to the service after delivery at the port of New Orleans. Those clauses which are specifically referred to in this case are numbered 3, 11 and 12 in the bill of lading. They read as follows:</p> <p>‘“3. No carrier shall be liable for loss or damage not occurring on its own road or its portion of the through route, nor after said property is ready for delivery to the next carrier or to consignee. . . . ”</p> <p>“ 11. No carrier shall be liable for delay, nor in any other respect than as warehousemen, while the said property awaits further conveyance, and in case the whole or any part of the property specified herein be prevented by any cause from going from said port in the first steamer, of the ocean line above stated, leaving after the arrival of such property at said port, the carrier hereunder then in possession is at liberty to forward said property by succeeding steamer of said line, or, if deemed necessary, by any other steamer.</p> <p>“ 12. This contract is executed and accomplished, and all liability hereunder terminates on the delivery of the said property to Lire steamship, her master, agent or servants, or to the steamship company, or on the steamship pier at the said port, and the inland freight charges shall be a first lien due and payable by the steamship company.”</p> <p>The usual method of handling cotton upon its arrival at the pier of the company at Westwego, Louisiana, is stated, as both counsel'in this case agree, with substantial accuracy in Texas dk Pacific Railway Company v. Clayton, 173 U. S. 348, 352, as-follows:</p> <p>“ The mode in which the railway company and the steamship company transacted business was as follows: Upon the shipment of cotton, bills of lading would be issued in Texas to the shipper. Thereupon the cotton would be loaded in the cars of the railway company and a way bill indicating the number and initial of the car, the number of the bill of lading, the date of shipment, the number of bales of cotton, the consignor, the consignee, tire-date of the bill of lading, the number of bales forwarded on that particular way bill, the marks of the cotton, the weight, rate, freights, amount prepaid, etc., would be given-to tbe conductor of the train bringing the car to Westwego. Upon the receipt of the way bill and car at Westwego, a ‘skeleton’ would be made out by the clerks at that place for the purpose of unloading the car properly. It contained, the essential items 6'f information covered by the way bill, and had also the date of the making of the skeleton. When this skeleton had thus been made out and the car had been pushed in on the side track in the rear of the wharf, it would be taken by a. clerk known as a ‘ check clerk,’ and with a gang of laborers, who actually handled the cotton and were employed by the railway company, the car would be Opened; and as the cotton was taken from the car bale'by bale the marks would be examined to see that they corresponded with the items on the skeleton, and the same were then checked. The cotton thus taken from the car was deposited at a place on the wharf designated by the check clerk, and it would remain there until the steamship company came and took it away. After the checking of the cotton in this way toascer-tain- that the amounts, marks and general information of the way bill were correct, the skeleton would be transmitted to the general office of the Texas and Pacific Pailway Company in New Orleans, which thereupon would make out what was designated as a ‘ transfer’ sheet ’ that contained substantially the ■information contained in the way bill, and which being at once transmitted to the steamship company or its. agents was a notification understood by the steamship company’s agents that cotton -for their line was on the wharf at Westwego ready, for them to come and take away. Upon the receipt of these transfer sheets the steamship company would collate the transfers relating to such cotton as was destined by them for'a particular vessel; advise the railway company with the return of the transfers'that this cotton would be ta,ken by the vessel named, and would’ thereupon send the vessel with their stevedores to the wharf at Westwego. The clerk at Westwego would go around the wharf and by the aid of the transfers returned from the steamship agents point out to the master or mate of the' vessel, or' the one.in charge of the loading, the particular lots of cotton named in the transfers and designated for his vessel, and the stevedores and their helpers would thereupon take the cotton and put it on board the ship. In connection with the loading upon the vessel or after the cotton was pointed out in lots, the master or mate would sign a mate’s receipt for this cotton. The stevedores and all men employed in loading the vessel were wholly in the employ of the steamship company. The time of coming to take cotton from the wharf was entirely in the control of the steamship company. They sent for it as soon as they were ready.”</p> <p>At the time of the fire it is conceded that no transfer or skeleton sheets had been sent to the' steamship company or notice given it of the arrival of this cotton at the pier of the railway company.</p>

Held: That the measure of the common law liability between connecting carriers is properly stated in the opinion in the next preceding case, and the cases therein referred to; (2) That under the wording of the fourth clause in the bill of lading the ' defendant was properly held liable; J3) That there was nothing to go to the jury upon the question of a delivery of the cotton to the steamship company under the twelfth…

Held: was subject to be diminished by the extent .of the charter hire, paid when the charter party was executed. A judgment was entered for the sum of $65,000, with interest and costs. 95 Fed. Hep. 485. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals coincided with the District Court, except it disapproved the conclusion that the value of the vessel should be reduced by the sum of the charter hire.

This was a complaint in the nature of a bill in equity filed by the' Southern Pacific Railroad Company in the Superior Court of Fresno County, California, against Isaac T. Bell, praying to be declared the rightful owner of a certain quarter section of land in that county, and that it be adjudged that the defendant Bell holds the legal title to said land in trust for the plaintiff, and requiring him to convey the same to it free of all encumbrances.

Tins was a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of California by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, plaintiff, against Otto Groeck and another, defendants, to obtain a decree declaring the company to be the rightful owner of the south half of a certain quarter section,of land in Kings County, California, and that defendants hold the legal title thereto in trust for it, a conveyance of which was prayed.