Wilson v. Nelson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

45 federal appellate · 45 district · 12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 124 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘Transfer’ is defined to be not only the sale of property, but ‘every other mode of disposing or parting with property.’ All technicality and narrowness of meaning is precluded. The word is used in its most comprehensive sense, and is intended to include every means and manner by which property can pass from the ownership and possession of another, and by which the result forbidden by the statute may be accomplished, — a preference enabling a creditor ‘to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other creditors of the same class.’ ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Metzger Toy & Novelty Co. · Johnston v. Huff, Andrews & Moyler Co.

2. ““This act of 1898 makes the result attained by the creditor, and not the specific intent of the debtor, the essential fact. In the ease at bar the warrant of attorney to confess judgment was, indeed, given by the debtor nearly thirteen years before. But being irrevocable, and continuing in force, the debtor thereby, without any further act of his, ‘suffered or permitted’ a judgment to be entered against him within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the effect of the enforcement of which judgment would be to enable the creditor to whom it was given to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors; .and the lien obtained, by which, in a proceeding begun within the four months, would be dissolved by the adjudication in bankruptcy, because ‘its existence and enforcement will work a preference.’ * * * The careful change in the language of all the provisions of the bankrupt act of 1898 from those of the former bankrupt acts upon the subject must have been intended by congress to prevent a debtor from giving a creditor an irrevocable warrant of attorney which would enable him at any time during the insolvency of the debtor, and within four months before a petition in bankruptcy, to obtain a judgment and levy the execution on all the property of the bankrupt, to the exclusion of his other creditors.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mathews v. Hardt

3. ““(1) That something mo;e than passive nonresistance of an insolvent debtor to regular judicial proceedings, in which a judgment and levy on his property are obtained, when the debt is due and he is without just defense to the action, is necessary to show a preference of a creditor, or a purpose to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act. “(2) That the fact that the debtor under such circumstances does not file a petition in bankruptcy is not sufficient evidence of such preference or of intent to defeat the operation of the act. “(3) That, although the judgment creditor in such case may know the insolvent condition of the debtor, his levy and seizure are not void under the circumstances, nor any violation of the bankrupt law. “(4) That a lien thus obtained by Mm will not be displaced by subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy against the debtor, though within four months of the filing; of the petition.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Golden Hill Distilling Co. v. Logue