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184 F. 889

Docket No. 2,072.

Willis v. Davis

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided February 7, 1911.)

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1911-02-07

Suit in equity by Charles Henry Davis, trustee of Naomi Lawton Davis', against Elizabeth Willis and others. Defendants Frederick A. Hull, Mary A. Hull, W. L. Millar, and Edward Willis appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate an order of dismissal as to them. On motion to dismiss appeal.

2 counsel of record

Relies on Brockett v. Brockett · Charles McMicken v. Franklin Perin · Roemer v. Neumann

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Motion granted · Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1911-02-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently March 1962

11 federal appellate ·

40191119201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1¶. Appeal and Error (§ 113*) — Appealable Orders — Obder Denting Motion to Vacate Dismissal.

¶2An appeal does not lie from an order denying a motion to set aside a prior order of dismissal as to certain defendants.

¶3[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 777; Dec. Dig. § 113.*]

¶4*8902. Appeal and Error (§ 257*) — Exceptions—Necessity of Exceptions to Order in Equity.

¶5No exception is necessary to give a right of appeal from an order of dismissal..

¶6[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Dee. Dig. § 257. *]

¶7Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

¶8Suit in equity by Charles Henry Davis, trustee of Naomi Lawton Davis', against Elizabeth Willis and others. Defendants Frederick A. Hull, Mary A. Hull, W. L. Millar, and Edward Willis appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate an order of dismissal as to them. On motion to dismiss appeal.

¶9Motion granted.

¶10Mordecai & Gadsden, Rutledge & Hagood, and Brown & Nuckols, for appellants.

¶11Frank Chinn, for appellee.

¶12Before KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge, and SATER and HOLLIS-TER, District Judges.

¶15PER CURIAM.

¶16On September 27, 1909, an order was made -upon the ex parte application of the complainant, dismissing the cause without prejudice as to the defendants Frederick A. Hull, Mary A. Hull, W. L. Millar, and Edward Willis. On October 6th following the defendants named moved the court to set aside the last-named order of dismissal on the grounds that they had no notice of the order and that they had asked for affirmative relief in their answer. On March 12, 1910, a motion to set aside the order of dismissal was denied. No appeal ivas taken from the order of dismissal. The appeal before us is from the order denying the motion to set aside the order of dismissal. When this appeal was taken the time for appealing from the original order had not expired. Complainant moves to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the order in question is not appealable.

¶17The motion to dismiss must be granted. An appeal will not lie from a refusal to open a prior decree and grant a rehearing. Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 228, 11 L. Ed. 251; Wylie v. Coxe, 14 How. 1, 14 L. Ed. 301; McMicken v. Perin, 18 How. 507, 15 L. Ed. 504; Roemer v. Bernheim, 132 U. S. 103, 106, 10 Sup. Ct. 12, S3 L. Ed. 277. Nor from a refusal to open a judgment. Connor v. Peugh, 18 How. 394, 15 L. Ed. 432; Cambuston v. United States, 95 U. S. 285, 24 L. Ed. 448. Nor from a refusal to reinstate a case after nonsuit. United States v. Evans, 5 Cranch, 280, 3 L. Ed. 101; Dexter v. Kellas (2d Circuit) 113 Fed. 48, 51 C. C. A. 35. There is nothing in the record to sustain the contention that the court reopened the case and reheard the motion to dismiss, and that the order appealed from was accordingly an order of dismissal. The language both of the opinion and of the order thereon.is distinctly to the contrary of this contention. Nor is there anything in the fact that the original order of dismissal was made without notice to the appellants, and thus without opportunity to be heard thereon or to reserve exception thereto, which precluded remedy by appeal from the original order, and so made it necessary *891(as contended) to have a motion to set aside acted upon before there 'was anything to appeal from. No exception was necessary to give the right of appeal from the original order.

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