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← 184 Ill. 2d 402 - People v. Gonzalez

184 Ill. 2d 402 - People v. Gonzalez’s Empirical Analysis

1998

Citation profile

107
cited by 107 later decisions
9
states following
July 2025
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 102 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 107 later decisions — most recently July 2025 · most notably 196 Ill. 2d 425 - People v. Sorenson (2001), 203 Ill. 2d 165 - People v. Gherna (2003)

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 102 state decisions

7501998200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Terry v. Ohio · Katz v. United States · Berkemer v. McCarty · United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 107 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It is clear under the rationale of Mimms and Wilson that the movements of occupants of a vehicle which is legitimately stopped may be subject to control by the police officer conducting the stop, even though the officer has no suspicion that the individuals have been involved in criminal behavior. This rule is dictated by the public’s strong interest in officer safety during potentially dangerous traffic stops when balanced against the minimal intrusion on privacy interests of the driver and passengers. Thus, consistent with the rationale of Mimms and Wilson, we conclude in the cause at bar, that, because the public interest in officer safety outweighs the potential intrusion to the passenger’s liberty interests, it is reasonable for a police officer to immediately instruct a passenger to remain at the car, when that passenger, of his own volition, exits the lawfully stopped vehicle at the outset of the stop. We find that because the same risk of harm to officers discussed in Mimms and Wilson is present where a passenger unexpectedly exits a lawfully stopped vehicle, the officer’s need to exercise ‘unquestioned command of the situation’ is likewise present.””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “If a passenger can be ordered out of a vehicle for the officer's safety, he can also be ordered back inside the vehicle for safety purposes. In fact, it may be even less of a privacy intrusion to order him back inside the car which is where he was prior to the stop. We cannot allow the officer's safety to depend on how fast the driver and passenger can get out of the vehicle after it has been stopped. Ordering the occupants back into the vehicle does no more than establish the status quo at the time of the stop. To hold otherwise could well lead to the unnecessary death of an officer, gunned down by those walking away who suddenly turn and fire or who circle behind the officer, either assaulting or killing him while he is talking to the driver.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.