¶1dissenting.
¶2Because the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, I respectfully dissent. Even considered in the light most favorable to the State, there is insufficient evidence in the record that defendant’s purpose was to rob or take the property of another.
¶3“ ‘An attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon occurs when a person, with the specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of personal property by endangering or threatening his life with a dangerous weapon, does some overt act calculated to bring about this result.’ ” State v. Gillis, 158 N.C. App. 48, 56, 580 S.E.2d 32, 38 (2003) (quoting State v. Allison, 319 N.C. 92, 96, 352 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1987)) (citations omitted). To sustain a charge of attempted armed robbery, “there must be evidence of an intent to rob the victim.” State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 668, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1966); see also State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 407 S.E.2d 200 (1991) (display of weapon without other indicias of intent to rob held insufficient to show attempt to rob where belongings of victim left undisturbed). “ ‘Evidence is not substantial if it arouses only a suspicion about the fact to be proved, even if the suspicion is strong.’ ” McDowell, 329 N.C. at 389, 407 S.E.2d at 215 (quoting State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110, 139, 353 S.E.2d 352, 368 (1987)).
¶4Here, defendant possessed a weapon and assaulted the storekeeper. That this event occurred in a convenience store that sells goods to others, and that defendant negotiated the counter where the cash register was located in a quest to attack the storekeeper and therefore placed himself in “close proximity to the store’s two cash registers” as the majority observes, are insufficient circumstances to constitute substantial evidence that defendant had the requisite spe*162cific intent to perpetrate a robbery. Defendant neither stated anything related to an intent to rob, nor committed any overt acts here other than (1) entering a store; (2) digesting cocaine; and (3) attacking an individual who stood on the side of the counter reserved for employees. Compare, e.g., State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 474 S.E.2d 345 (1996) (accused assaults victim with knife and states, “give me your money”); State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 455 S.E.2d 627 (1995) (defendant pulls weapon on cashier during third visit into shop near closing time and states, “[d]on’t even try it”). Were the evidence here sufficient to show an attempted armed robbery, virtually any assault on an individual who is associated or employed by an establishment that occurs at or near something of value might be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This is not the law of North Carolina.
¶5Because the evidence, at best, raises only a suspicion that defendant possessed the requisite intent to rob, the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon charge.