¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent, observing a well-established rule of appellate law:
Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same *412court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.... While we recognize that a panel of the Court of Appeals may disagree with, or even find error in, an opinion by a prior panel and may duly note its disagreement or point out that error in its opinion, the panel is bound by that prior decision until it is overturned by a higher court.
¶3State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 487, 598 S.E.2d 125, 133-34 (2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
¶4In State v. Fuller, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to prevent the State from presenting extrapolation evidence from the same expert witness at issue in the instant case. 176 N.C. App. 104, 107-08, 626 S.E.2d 655, 657-58 (2006). The defendant in Fuller, as here, argued that she had insufficient time to procure a rebuttal witness. We noted “defendant’s clear understanding of the importance of this evidence to the State’s case against her and its longstanding acceptance in the courts of this state.” Id. at 108, 626 S.E.2d at 658. Indeed, such evidence has been offered in North Carolina since 1985. State v. Catoe, 78 N.C. App. 167, 169-70, 336 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 380, 344 S.E.2d 1 (1986); see also State v. Taylor, 165 N.C. App. 750, 752-58, 600 S.E.2d 483, 486-89 (2004); State v. Davis, 142 N.C. App. 81, 89-90, 542 S.E.2d 236, 241, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 386, 547 S.E.2d 818 (2001).
¶5Here, although the record may not contain definitive evidence as to whether Defendant had notice of the results of the three a.m. blood test, neither is there any suggestion — by either the State or Defendant himself, in his arguments to this Court — that the trial court had incomplete information as to Defendant’s notice and degree of knowledge. In light of the facts at issue in this case, Defendant unquestionably had notice that the State would offer evidence as to his alleged impairment and blood alcohol content. The “longstanding acceptance” of extrapolation evidence likewise should have put Defendant on notice that the State would use his blood tests to estimate his blood alcohol content at the time of the crash. The sole surprise was the name of the expert, which should not have precluded Defendant from preparing a rebuttal.
¶6*413I see no meaningful distinction between the facts in the instant case and those of Fuller. As such, our decision should be controlled by our prior precedent. Jones, 358 N.C. at 487, 598 S.E.2d at 133-34.1 would therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to continue, as well as reach the merits of Defendant’s other arguments.
¶7. I note, too, that even assuming arguendo that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to continue, such error was not prejudicial to Defendant. The expert testimony at trial was actually more beneficial to Defendant, as the expert stated that his blood alcohol content would have been 0.07 (and below the legal limit), rather than the 0.08 stated in his report. Moreover, the State had other evi*413dence against Defendant, including testimony as to his earlier blood tests, paramedic testimony that the car smelled of alcohol, and witness testimony that he was driving erratically immediately prior to the accident, that would have supported the jury’s verdicts; the issue of impairment did not need to be proven as an element of any of the crimes of which he was convicted.