Alfred Booth v. People of the State of Illinois’s Empirical Analysis
184 U.S. 425 · 1902
Citation profile
27 federal appellate · 36 district · 134 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 303 later decisions (42 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2015 · most notably Meyer v. State of Nebraska (1923), Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977)
27 federal appellate · 36 district · 134 state decisions — followed in 29 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Mugler v. State of Kansas State of Kansas Tufts · Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana · Minnesota v. Barber · Brimmer v. Rebman
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 303 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The argument then is, that the statute directly forbids the citizen from pursuing a calling which, in itself, involves no dement of immorality, and therefore by such prohibition it invades his liberty as guaranteed by the supreme law of the' land, Does this conclusion follow from the premise stated? Is it true that the legislature is without power to forbid or suppress a particular kind of business, where such business, properly and honestly conducted, may not, in itself, be immoral? We think not. A calling may not in itself be immoral, and yet the tendency of what is generally or ordinarily or often done in pursuing that calling may be towards that which is admittedly immoral or pernicious. If, looking at all the circumstances that attend, or which may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a particular calling, the state thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling be actually prohibited, the courts cannot interfere, unless, looking through mere forms and at the substance of the matter, they can say that the statute enacted professedly to protect the public morals has no real or substantial relation to that object, but is a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law.””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Whoever contracts to have, or give to bimself or another, the option to sell or buy at a future time any grain, or other commodity, stock of any railroad or other company, or gold, to forestall the market by spreading false rumors to influence the price of commodities therein,” etc., “shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or confined in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both; and all contracts made in violation of this section shall be considered gambling contracts and shall be void.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The argument then is that the statute directly forbids the citizen from pursuing a calling which, in itself, involves no element of immorality, and therefore by such prohibition it invades Ms liberty as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land. Does this conclusion follow from the premise stated? Is it true that the Legislature is without power to forbid or suppress a particular kind of business, whore such business, properly and honestly conducted, may mot, In itself, be immoral? We think not. A calling may not in itself be immoral, and yet the tendency of what is generally or ordinarily or often done in pursuing that calling may be towards that which is admittedly immoral or pernicious. If, looking at all the circumstances that attend, or which may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a particular calling, the state thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling be actually prohibited, the courts cannot interfere, unless, looking through mere forms and at the substance of the matter, they ean say that the statute enacted professedly to protect the public morals has no real or substantial relation to that object, but is a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 , 601 [ 8 Sup. Ct. 273 , 31 L. Ed. 205 ]; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 , 320 [ 10 Sup. Ct. 862 , 34 L. Ed. 455 ]; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 [ 11 Sup. Ct 213 , 34 L. Ed. 862 ]; Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wiseman v. Tanner
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.