¶1This appeal is from a judgment in favor of appellee real estate broker in an action brought by him to recover a commission.
¶2*509Appellant had inherited certain property-prior to her marriage which she listed with the broker under her maiden name. The following day the broker produced a buyer ready, willing and financially able to purchase the property on the terms agreed upon, and a contract was immediately executed by appellant under her maiden name. At settlement, however, appellant’s husband refused to join in the conveyance and the sale was not consummated.
¶3Appellant testified that at the time of signing she was unaware of the necessity of having her husband join in the conveyance, and that the broker failed to so advise her, although he knew at the time that she was married. The broker testified that he did not learn of her marriage until after the contract was executed.
¶4We must decide whether the broker is entitled to his commission when appellant was unable to convey good title due to the refusal of her husband to join in the conveyance. It is well established that a broker is entitled to his commission when, in good faith, he procures a buyer ready, willing and financially able to purchase the property on the terms agreed upon. In essence appellant contends that the broker did not act in good faith; that he knew she was married; that he should have advised her of the necessity of having her husband join in the conveyance; and that he should not be permitted to recover his commission because he had knowledge of a defect in her title which subsequently prevented the consummation of the sale.
¶5There is widespread acceptance of the rule that knowledge of the fact that the principal does not have the sole interest in the property will not defeat the right of the broker to his commission when the principal is unable to convey good title due to the refusal of his wife to join in the conveyance.
¶6Nor do the circumstances in this case support appellant’s contention that the broker should have ascertained her marital status and advised' her of the necessity of persuading her husband to join in the con*510veyance. Title to the property was recorded in appellant’s maiden name as the surviving joint tenant of her mother. Furthermore, both the listing and the contract for the sale of the property were executed by appellant in her maiden name.
¶7The remaining assignment of error is without merit.
¶8Affirmed.
¶9. See Roy v. Huard, 157 Mo. 477, 174 A.2d 41 (1901); Weltman’s, Inc. v. Friedman, 102 F.Supp. 485 (D.C., 1952); see generally Annot., 169 A.L.R. 605; Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1398.
¶10. See Campbell v. Arthur H. Campbell & Co., 155 Tenn. 515, 296 S.W. 9 (1927).
¶11. See Price v. Francis, 184 Va. 484, 35 S.E.2d 823 (1945); Martin v. Ede, 103 Cal. 157, 37 P. 199 (1894). See also Weltman’s, Inc. v. Friedman, supra n. 1.
¶12. Cf. Roy v. Huard, supra n. 1.
¶13. See Hurt v. Sands Co., 236 Ky. 729, 33 S.W.2d 653 (1930).