Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis’s Empirical Analysis
185 F.3d 693 · 1999
Citation profile
42 federal appellate · 10 district · 7 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 105 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2025 · most notably District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), United States of America v. Timothy Joe Emerson (2001)
42 federal appellate · 10 district · 7 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (§ 40221 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 18 U.S.C. § 921 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 925 · 42 U.S.C. § 2021E · 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Radiation Exposure Compensation Act)
Relies on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · Warth v. Seldin · Coleman v. Thompson · Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment · Baker v. Carr
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 105 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“does not argue (and we do not believe under any plausible set of facts that he could) that the viability and efficacy of state militias will be undermined by prohibiting those convicted of perpetrating domestic violence from possessing weapons in or affecting interstate commerce”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“Congress is free to “take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” [citations omitted]. For a legislature concerned about the harm that may befall victims of domestic violence from firearms, persons already convicted of domestic violence are a logical starting, if not ending point... .[B]y definition, those convicted of domestic violence offenses have already harmed their domestic partners in some fashion. It certainly would not be irrational for Congress to conclude that these individuals pose the most acute danger of turning a gun on a family member. [[Image here]] We likewise reject the notion that the firearms ban may be irrational to the extent it reaches individuals like Gillespie, who carry firearms in the public interest. That someone previously convicted of engaging in domestic violence may possess a firearm for public rather than private purposes does not negate the possibility that he might use that gun against someone in his household. Congress could, therefore, reasonably conclude that the reasons for an individual carrying a gun are irrelevant and that it is the individual’s criminal history which should determine his right to do so.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Gillespie v. State“an offense that — (i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.